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The abstract nature of Dung’s seminal theory of argumentation accounts for its widespread
application as a general framework for various species of non-monotonic reasoning, and,
more generally, reasoning in the presence of conﬂict. A Dung argumentation framework
is instantiated by arguments and a binary conﬂict based attack relation, deﬁned by some
underlying logical theory. The justiﬁed arguments under different extensional semantics
are then evaluated, and the claims of these arguments deﬁne the inferences of the
underlying theory. To determine a unique set of justiﬁed arguments often requires a
preference relation on arguments to determine the success of attacks between arguments.
However, preference information is often itself defeasible, conﬂicting and so subject
to argumentation. Hence, in this paper we extend Dung’s theory to accommodate
arguments that claim preferences between other arguments, thus incorporating meta-
level argumentation based reasoning about preferences in the object level. We then deﬁne
and study application of the full range of Dung’s extensional semantics to the extended
framework, and study special classes of the extended framework. The extended theory
preserves the abstract nature of Dung’s approach, thus aiming at a general framework for
non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defeasible reasoning about as well as with
preference information. We illustrate by formalising argument based logic programming
with defeasible priorities in the extended theory.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The formal study of argumentation has come to be increasingly central as a core study within Artiﬁcial Intelligence [12].
Logic based models of argumentation are being applied to formalisation of defeasible reasoning and conﬂict resolution
over beliefs and goals, and to decision making over actions [1,8,24,25,35]. The inherently dialectical nature of these models
have provided foundations for formalisation of argumentation-based dialogues [5], where, for example, one agent seeks
to persuade another to adopt a belief it does not already hold to be true [33], or when agents deliberate about what
actions to execute [21], or negotiate over resources [4]. Furthermore, recent major research projects [6,7] are developing
general models of argumentation based inference, decision making and dialogue, and implementations of these models for
deployment in agent and semantic grid applications.
Many of the above theoretical and practical developments build on Dung’s seminal theory of argumentation [19]. A Dung
argumentation framework is a directed graph consisting of a set of arguments Args and a binary conﬂict based attack re-
lation R on Args. The extensions, and so justiﬁed arguments of a framework are then deﬁned under different semantics,
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application of an ‘acceptability calculus’, whereby an argument X ∈ Args is said to be acceptable with respect to S ⊆ Args iff
any argument Y that attacks X is itself attacked by some argument Z in S (intuitively, any such Z is said to reinstate X ).
For example, if S is a maximal (under set inclusion) set such that all its contained arguments are acceptable with respect
to S , then S is said to be an extension under the preferred semantics.
Recent years have witnessed intensive formal study, development and application of Dungs ideas in various directions.
This can be attributed to the abstract nature of a Dung argumentation framework, and the encoding of intuitive, generic
principles of commonsense reasoning through application of the acceptability calculus. The underlying logic, and deﬁni-
tion of the logic’s constructed arguments Args and attack relation R is left unspeciﬁed, thus enabling instantiation of a
framework by various logical formalisms. A theory’s inferences can then be deﬁned in terms of the claims of the justiﬁed
arguments constructed from the theory (an argument essentially being a proof of a candidate inference – the argument’s
claim – in the underlying logic). Dung’s theory can therefore be understood as a semantics for non-monotonic reasoning. In
this view, what appropriately accounts for the correctness of an inference is that it can be shown to rationally prevail in the
face of opposing inferences, where it is application of the acceptability calculus that encodes logic neutral, rational means
for establishing such standards of correctness. Indeed, many logic programming formalisms and non-monotonic logics (e.g.
default, auto-epistemic, defeasible, non-monotonic modal logics and certain instances of circumscription) have been shown
to conform to Dung’s semantics [13,18–20].
Dung’s extensional semantics may yield multiple extensions. The sceptically justiﬁed arguments are those that appear
in every extension. However, one may then be faced with the problem of how to choose between conﬂicting credulously
justiﬁed arguments that belong to at least one, but not all extensions. To illustrate, consider two individuals P and Q
exchanging arguments A, B . . . about the weather forecast:
P1: “Today will be dry in London since the BBC forecast sunshine” = A.
Q1: “Today will be wet in London since CNN forecast rain” = B .
A and B claim contradictory conclusions and so attack each other (symmetrically attack). Under Dung’s preferred semantics,
there are two extensions: {A} and {B}. Neither argument is sceptically justiﬁed. One solution is to provide some means for
preferring one argument to another. Some works (e.g., [32,34]) formalise the role of preferences in the underlying logical
formalisms that instantiate a Dung framework. For example, in [32], if X undercuts Y (where ‘undercut’ denotes a certain
type of conﬂict based interaction), then XRY if Y is not stronger than (preferred to) X . Other approaches formalise the
role of preferences at an abstract level. In Amgoud and Cayrol’s Preference based Argumentation Frameworks [3], a Dung
framework is augmented with a preference ordering on Args, so that an attack by X on Y is successful only if Y is not
preferred to X . In Bench-Capon’s Value based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs) [11], a Dung framework is augmented with
values and value orderings, so that an attack by X on Y is successful only if the value promoted by Y is not ranked higher
than the value promoted by X according to a given ordering on values.
Examining the role of preferences in the above weather example, one might reason that A is preferred to B because the
BBC are deemed more trustworthy than CNN. Hence B does not successfully attack A, and so this attack can be removed
and we are only left with the successful attack from A to B . Thus only {A} will be a preferred extension; A is sceptically
justiﬁed. This example illustrates resolution of an argumentation framework obtained by replacing symmetric attacks with
asymmetric attacks. Properties relating frameworks and their resolutions have been studied in [9] and [26]. Properties of
frameworks obtained through removal of asymmetric attacks have also been studied in the context of VAFs.
1.2. Overview of paper
Information required to determine the success of an attack is often assumed pre-speciﬁed, as a given preference or value
ordering. However, preference information may be contradictory, given that preferences may vary according to context, and
distinct sources may valuate the strengths of arguments using different criteria, or indeed assign different valuations for any
given criterion. Thus, one often needs to reason, and indeed argue about, as well as with, defeasible and possibly conﬂicting
preference information. To illustrate, consider continuation of the above dialogue about the weather:
P2: “But the BBC are more trustworthy than CNN” = C .
Q2: “However, statistically CNN are more accurate forecasters than the BBC” = C ′ .
Q3: “And basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison on your instincts
about their relative trustworthiness” = E .
Argument C is not an argument that attacks B; rather it is an argument expressing a preference for A over B . However,
C ′ expresses a preference for B over A. C and C ′ attack each other since they express contradictory preferences. Finally,
argument E claims that C ′ is preferred to C , and so only C ′ successfully attacks C . We thus have a sceptically justiﬁed
argument C ′ claiming that B is preferred to A, and so B is sceptically justiﬁed.
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paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review Dung’s theory of argumentation. In the sections that follow we
describe our contributions to the formal study and application of argumentation:
• In Sections 3 and 4, Dung’s theory of argumentation is extended to integrate ‘metalevel’ argumentation about pref-
erences between arguments. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung’s approach. Arguments expressing
preferences (preference arguments) are simply nodes in a graph, and application of preferences is abstractly characterised; by
deﬁning a new attack relation that originates from a preference argument, and that attacks an attack between the arguments
that are the subject of the preference claim. Thus, no commitment is made to how preferences are deﬁned and applied
in the formalism instantiating the framework. Preference arguments expressing contradictory preferences attack each other,
where these attacks can then themselves be attacked by preference arguments. We then extend Dung’s acceptability calcu-
lus so that both arguments and attacks need to be reinstated. The extensional semantics for the extended framework are
then deﬁned in exactly the same way as for a Dung framework, and some basic results that hold of the extensional se-
mantics for a Dung framework are also shown to hold for the extended framework. Our aim is to therefore lay foundations
for straightforward modiﬁcation of applications and developments of Dung’s work to accommodate argumentation about
preferences.
• The extended theory provides a general setting for formally studying the application of preferences in argumentation,
and, more generally, the removal of attacks. Thus, the above mentioned work on resolutions of frameworks [9,26] can now
be extended to account for the use of preference arguments in obtaining such resolutions. In this paper we study two
special classes of extended argumentation framework: Section 5 studies hierarchical frameworks that posit restrictions on
interactions between arguments at the object and metalevel, and Section 6 studies preference symmetric frameworks that
only allow for removal of attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments.
• The extended theory is proposed as a unifying framework in which to formalise and extend works that augment Dung’s
framework with preferences [3,11]. In support of this proposal, Section 5 describes how value based argumentation [11] can
be formalised and extended in hierarchical frameworks in order to integrate metalevel reasoning about values and value
orderings.
• The extended theory is proposed as a semantics for object level non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defea-
sible reasoning about priorities. Such formalisms extend the object level logical languages for argument construction with
rules for deriving priorities amongst rules, e.g., in default logic [14] and logic programming [24,34]. One can then construct
‘priority arguments’ whose claims determine preferences between other mutually attacking arguments. Arguments claiming
conﬂicting priorities may be constructed and preferences between these can be established on the basis of other priority
arguments. Our approach generalises these formalisms in that preferences may be based not only on rule priorities, but
on any criterion for valuating argument strength, including criteria that relate to the argument as a whole (such as the
value promoted by an argument). Furthermore, these formalisms do not straightforwardly allow for application of Dung’s
acceptability calculus, and evaluation of the justiﬁed arguments under the full range of Dung’s semantics. The extended
framework provides for such evaluation, through provision of an abstract characterisation of preference application while
retaining the basic conceptual machinery of Dung. In Section 7 we show how the extended theory can serve as a semantics
for Prakken and Sartor’s argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities (ALP-DP) [34].1 Arguments deﬁned
by an ALP-DP theory instantiate a preference symmetric framework, so that in contrast with [34], one can then evaluate the
justiﬁed arguments of an ALP-DP theory under all of Dung’s semantics.
In Section 8 we discuss related work; in particular the work of Kakas and Moraitis [23,24], and conclude and indicate
directions for future work in Section 9. Finally, the reader is referred to the appendix for proofs of the paper’s proposi-
tions.
2. Dung’s theory of argumentation
In this section we review Dung’s theory of argumentation [19].
Deﬁnition 1. A Dung argumentation framework is a tuple AF = (Args,R), where Args is a set of arguments, and R ⊆
Args× Args.
Fig. 1 shows an argumentation framework in which an arrow from X to Y denotes that (X, Y ) ∈ R.
Dung then deﬁnes the acceptability of arguments, and the characteristic function and admissible extensions of a frame-
work.
1 Note that extended frameworks and their instantiation by [34]’s logic programming formalism were ﬁrst introduced in [28]. This paper contains a
modiﬁed (simpliﬁed) account of the formalism described in [28], as well as additionally providing proofs of results, a formal description of the special cases
of the extended frameworks and their properties, and formalisation of metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings in the extended framework.
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Deﬁnition 2. Let AF = (Args,R), S ⊆ Args and let A, B,C, . . . denote arguments in Args. Then:
1. S is conﬂict free iff ∀A, B ∈ S it is not the case that (A, B) ∈ R.
2. A is acceptable with respect to S iff ∀B ∈ Args: if (B, A) ∈ R then there is a C ∈ S such that (C, B) ∈ R.
3. The characteristic function of AF , denoted FAF , is deﬁned as follows:
– FAF : 2Args → 2Args;
– FAF(S) = {A | A is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
4. If S is conﬂict free, then S is an admissible extension of AF iff each argument in S is acceptable with respect to S (i.e.,
S ⊆ FAF(S)).
Intuitively, an argument A is acceptable with respect to S if for any argument B that attacks A, there is a C in S that
attacks B , in which case C is said to defend or ‘reinstate’ A. An admissible extension S can then be interpreted as a coherent
defendable position. From hereon, since we will refer to an arbitrary but ﬁxed argumentation framework, we will write F
instead of FAF .
Admissibility is augmented by preferred, complete, stable and grounded semantics:
Deﬁnition 3. Let AF = (Args,R), S a conﬂict free subset of Args, and F the characteristic function of AF . Then:
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S (S = F (S)).
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B /∈ S , ∃A ∈ S such that (A, B) ∈ R.
• S is the grounded extension iff S is the least ﬁxed point of F (the smallest complete extension).
For s ∈ {complete, preferred, stable, grounded}, an argument is said to be sceptically justiﬁed under the s semantics if
it belongs to all extensions. An argument is said to be only credulously justiﬁed under the s semantics if it belongs to
at least one, but not all, extensions. Sceptical and credulous justiﬁcation coincide for the grounded semantics given that a
framework only ever has a single grounded extension.
The admissible extensions of the framework in Fig. 1 are: ∅, {A}, {B}, {A, D}, and {B, D}. {A, D}, and {B, D} are the
preferred and stable extensions. ∅, {A, D}, and {B, D} are the complete extensions, and ∅ the grounded extension. Note that
D is sceptically justiﬁed under the preferred semantics, but is not sceptically justiﬁed under the grounded semantics.
3. Extended argumentation frameworks
In this section we motivate extending Dung’s framework to include arguments that express preferences between other
arguments, and so determine whether attacks succeed. Following convention, we may in what follows synonymously write
‘defeats’ instead of ‘successfully attacks’.
Recall the weather forecast example in Section 1 in which arguments A and B symmetrically attack ((A, B), (B, A) ∈ R).
Hence {A} and {B} are admissible. We have that A is preferred to B (claimed by argument C ). Hence B does not successfully
attack (defeat) A, but A does defeat B . If we were to evaluate admissibility on the basis of defeats, then {A} is admissible,
and {B} is not an admissible extension.
The impact of argument C could conceivably be modelled by letting C attack B (1 in Fig. 2). This would yield the
required result: only {A} is admissible. However, suppose an argument D that defeats A (e.g. D = “the BBC forecast is for
Glasgow and not London”). Then {B} would still not be admissible (2 in Fig. 2), which is clearly inappropriate. C expresses
a preference for A over B , but if A is defeated by another argument, then B should be reinstated.
Intuitively, C is an argument about the relationship between A and B . Speciﬁcally, in expressing a preference for A over
B , C is an argument for A’s defence against B ’s attack on A. That is, C defence attacks B ’s attack on A (3 in Fig. 2) so
that B ’s attack on A does not succeed as a defeat. B ’s attack on A is, as it were, cancelled out, and we are left with A
defeating B . Now, if D defeats A, D reinstates B and {B, D} is an admissible extension of 4 in Fig. 2.
Of course, given C ′ claiming a preference for B over A and so defence (d) attacking A’s attack on B , then the issue of
which attack succeeds as a defeat is once again unresolved. Intuitively, C and C ′ claim contradictory preferences and so
attack each other (5 in Fig. 2). These attacks can themselves be subject to d attacks in order to determine the defeat
relation between C and C ′ and so A and B . In 6 in Fig. 2, E d attacks the attack from C to C ′ , and so determines that
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Fig. 3. The EAF for the weather forecast example.
C ′ defeats C . Hence, C ’s d-attack on B ’s attack on A is cancelled out, and we are left with B defeating A; the discussion
concludes in favour of Q’s argument that it will be a wet day in London.
We now formally deﬁne the elements of an Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF). As suggested by the above example,
this involves extending Dung’s argumentation framework to include a second attack relation D that ranges from arguments
X to attacks (Y , Z ) ∈ R, where R is the standard binary attack relation in a Dung framework. If X attacks (Y , Z ) then X
expresses that Z is preferred to Y . If X ′ attacks (Z , Y ), then X ′ expresses that Y is preferred to Z . Hence, EAFs are required
to conform to the constraint that any such arguments expressing contradictory preferences must attack each other (i.e.,
(X, X ′), (X ′, X ) ∈ R).
Deﬁnition 4. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tuple (Args,R,D) such that Args is a set of arguments, and:
• R ⊆ Args× Args,
• D ⊆ Args× R,
• If (X, (Y , Z)), (X ′, (Z , Y )) ∈ D then (X, X ′), (X ′, X) ∈ R.
Notation 1. From hereon we may use the following notation:
• Y ⇀ Z denotes (Y , Z) ∈ R. If in addition (Z , Y ) ∈ R, we may write Y  Z .
• X (Y ⇀ Z) denotes (X, (Y , Z)) ∈ D.
Example 1. The EAF for the weather forecasting example is (see Fig. 3):
Args= {A, B,C,C ′, E}, R = {(A, B), (B, A), (C,C ′), (C ′,C)}, D = {(C, (B, A)), (C ′, (A, B)), (E, (C,C ′))}.
In an EAF, preferences are not deﬁned by some externally given preference ordering, but are themselves claimed by
arguments. Intuitively, given that an argument A attacks B , then one would reason that A defeats B , only if the arguments S
that one is currently committed to, contain no argument claiming that B is preferred to A. That is to say, the success of an
attack as a defeat is parameterised w.r.t. the preference arguments available in some such set S of arguments.2
2 Note that the logic programming formalisms in [34] and [24] similarly qualify the success of an attack A on B w.r.t. arguments, in some given set S ,
expressing priorities over rules in A and B . These works are discussed in Sections 7 and 8 respectively.
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Deﬁnition 5. Let (Args,R,D) be an EAF and S ⊆ Args. Then A defeatsS B iff (A, B) ∈ R and ¬∃C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B)) ∈ D.
If A defeatsS B and B does not defeatS A then A strictly defeatsS B .
From hereon we may write A →S B to denote that A defeatsS B and AS B to denote that A does not defeatS B .
Example 2. Let  be the EAF:
A B, C  (A ⇀ B).
A and B defeatS each other for S = ∅, {A} and {B}. Also, B defeats{C} A, but A does not defeat{C} B (i.e., B strictly
defeats{C} A).
We state an obvious property of the defeat relation:
Proposition 1. If A defeatsS B, then ∀S ′ ⊆ S, A defeatsS ′ B.
We now deﬁne a conﬂict free set S of arguments. One might deﬁne such a set as one in which no two arguments
attack each other. However, if A asymmetrically attacks B (A ⇀ B) but an argument C claims that B is preferred to A
(C  (A ⇀ B)) then B and A may both be justiﬁed. We may therefore want to allow both A and B to appear in an
admissible extension of an EAF, which (as in the case of a Dung framework) will be deﬁned as a conﬂict free set S whose
contained arguments are acceptable w.r.t. S . This would clearly be inappropriate if arguments A and B refer to logically
incompatible states of affairs as when arguing about what is believed to be the case. However, this may be appropriate
in a practical reasoning context. Consider value based argumentation over action [8] in which an argument B justifying a
course of action, such as a medical treatment, is asymmetrically attacked by an argument A claiming that the treatment is
prohibitively expensive. If the value promoted by B (improving patient health) is ranked higher than that promoted by A
(reducing costs), then the attack is removed and both arguments may then be held as justiﬁed. One accepts that the action
is expensive, while still pursuing the course of action (this example will be formalised in Section 5). Hence, a conﬂict free
set is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an EAF. Then S ⊆ Args is conﬂict free iff ∀A, B ∈ S: if (A, B) ∈ R, then (B, A) /∈ R and
∃C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B)) ∈ D.
Intuitively, if A, B ∈ S and A attacks B , then S is conﬂict free only if B does not attack A and there is a C that defence
attacks the attack from A to B . Suppose the EAF (Args = {A, B,C}, R = {(A, B)}, D = {(C, (A, B))}). Then S = {A, B} is not
conﬂict free, but S ′ = {A, B,C} is conﬂict free. Note that no two arguments in a conﬂict free set defeat each other:
Proposition 2. Let S be conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args,R,D). Then for any X, Y ∈ S, X does not defeatS Y .
The right to left half of Proposition 2 does not hold. The following is a counter-example that will be discussed later in
Section 7.
Example 3. Referring to the EAF in Fig. 4, no two arguments in {S} = {A, B,C, D} defeatS each other. However S is not
conﬂict free since it contains arguments that symmetrically attack.
4. Extensional semantics for extended argumentation frameworks
In this section extensional semantics for an EAF are deﬁned in much the same way as for Dung frameworks. However,
the deﬁnition of acceptability for EAFs extends Dung’s deﬁnition.
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4.1. Deﬁning the acceptability of arguments
Consider Example 2 (see Fig. 5a). Is A acceptable w.r.t. S = {A}? We have that B →S A, and the only argument that can
reinstate A is A itself, via the defeat A →S B denoting that A successfully attacks B w.r.t. S . However, the success of A’s
attack on B is under challenge by the d attack from the argument C expressing that B is preferred to A. Hence, we need
to ensure that some argument in S defeatsS C , effectively ‘reinstating’ A →S B . One might therefore propose the following
deﬁnition of acceptability:
Ac1: Let (Args, R, D) be an EAF. A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ Args iff ∀B ∈ Args such that B →S A, there is a C ∈ S
such that C →S B and ∀D ∈ Args s.t. (D, (C, B)) ∈ D, there is a E ∈ S s.t. E →S D .
Recall that an admissible Dung extension is a set S whose contained arguments are acceptable w.r.t. S . One can then
motivate a suitably ‘rational’ deﬁnition of acceptability by appealing to some basic intuitions that the derived notion of
admissibility should satisfy. Speciﬁcally, Dung’s ‘Fundamental Lemma’ [19] expresses that if S is admissible, and A is accept-
able w.r.t. S , then S ∪ {A} should be admissible. Intuitively, an admissible extension represents a coherent set of arguments
– a ‘position’ – that defends (in the sense of reinstating) each of its contained arguments. If I have already established
such a position S in the course of an argument with an adversary, and show that given this position I can defend another
argument A that I propose, then clearly I would want that upon inclusion of A in S , A does not undermine S by making
some argument in S no longer defended by S .
Ac1’s deﬁnition of acceptability, and the derived notion of admissibility, fails to satisfy the fundamental lemma. Consider
Fig. 5b, in which A1 and A2 (which is not attacked by any argument) are Ac1 acceptable w.r.t. S , and so S is Ac1 admissible.
However, B3 (which is not attacked by any argument) is acceptable w.r.t. S , but S ′ = {A1, A2} ∪ {B3} is not admissible since
A1 is now not Ac1 acceptable w.r.t. S ′ . This is because the inclusion of B3 in S ′ means that A2S ′ B2. Dung frameworks
satisfy the fundamental lemma because every attack originating from an argument in an admissible extension is preserved
by inclusion of an argument acceptable w.r.t. the extension. This is not the case for EAFs. Inclusion of B3 cancels out the
attack from A2 to B2, so that A2 no longer defeats B2. Hence, a deﬁnition of acceptability that ensures satisfaction of
the fundamental lemma will require that when checking the acceptability of A1 w.r.t. S , one not only needs to check that
A1→S B1 is reinstated, but also that A2→S B2 is reinstated. The latter is not the case since no argument in S defeatsS B3.
In general, we need to check for the existence of a defeat reinstatement set.
Deﬁnition 7. Let S ⊆ Args in (Args, R, D). Then RS = {X1 →S Y1, . . . , Xn →S Yn} is a reinstatement set for C →S B , iff:
1. C →S B ∈ RS ,
2. for i = 1 . . .n, Xi ∈ S ,
3. ∀X →S Y ∈ RS , ∀Y ′ s.t. (Y ′, (X, Y )) ∈ D, there is a X ′ →S Y ′ ∈ RS .
We now formally deﬁne the acceptability of an argument:
Deﬁnition 8. Let (Args, R, D) be an EAF. A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ Args, iff: ∀B s.t. B →S A, there is a C ∈ S s.t.
C →S B and there is a reinstatement set for C →S B .
Under this deﬁnition of acceptability, S in Fig. 5b is not admissible since A1 is not acceptable w.r.t. S . In Fig. 5c, A
is acceptable w.r.t. S , given the reinstatement set {C →S B,C1 →S B1,C2 →S B2} for C →S B . If in addition we had an
argument B3 such that B3 (C2 ⇀ B2) and no argument in S that defeatsS B3, then no reinstatement set for C →S B
would exist. Note that the acceptability of an argument with respect to a set S does not amount to checking whether S
is admissible. In Fig. 5c, suppose an additional argument B4 that attacked and defeatedS C2. A would still be acceptable
w.r.t. S , but S would not be admissible.
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The admissible, preferred, complete and stable extensions of an EAF are now deﬁned in the same way as for Dung
frameworks:
Deﬁnition 9. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args, R, D). Then:
• S is an admissible extension iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S .
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S .
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B /∈ S , ∃A ∈ S such that A defeatsS B .
For s ∈ {preferred, complete, stable}, A is sceptically, respectively credulously, justiﬁed under the s semantics iff A is in
every, respectively at least one, s extension. Note that {B,C ′, E} is the single preferred, complete, and stable extension in
Example 1.
We now state some basic results that hold of Dung and Extended Argumentation Frameworks. In particular, checking for
existence of a reinstatement set when deﬁning acceptability ensures that Dung’s fundamental lemma holds for EAFs:
Proposition 3. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an Extended Argumentation Framework, S an admissible extension of , and let A, A′ be
arguments which are acceptable w.r.t S. Then:
1. S ′ = S ∪ {A} is admissible.
2. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ .
Proposition 4 follows immediately from Proposition 3:
Proposition 4. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an Extended Argumentation Framework.
1. The set of all admissible extensions of  form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.
2. For each admissible extension E of  there exists a preferred extension E ′ of  such that E ⊆ E ′ .
Since ∅ is an admissible extension of every EAF, then Proposition 4 implies that:
Corollary 1. Every EAF possesses at least one preferred extension.
As in the case of a Dung framework, not every EAF has a stable extension. For example, the EAF A ⇀ A does not have a
stable extension. Finally:
Proposition 5. Every stable extension of an EAF is a preferred extension but not vice versa.
In [19], the grounded extension of a Dung framework AF = (Args,R) is deﬁned as the least ﬁxed point of the framework’s
characteristic function F (see Deﬁnitions 2 and 3). F is shown to be monotonic, i.e., if S ⊆ S ′ then F (S) ⊆ F (S ′), where S and
S ′ are both subsets of Args. The monotonicity of F guarantees the existence of a least ﬁxed point and gives it a constructive
ﬂavour: its least ﬁxed point – the AF ’s grounded extension (GE(AF)) – can be approached under iterated application of F to
the empty set. Deﬁning the sequence:
• F 0 = ∅,
• F i+1 = F (F i),
then GE(AF) ⊆⋃∞i=0(F i).
If AF is ﬁnitary, i.e., every argument is attacked by at most a ﬁnite number of arguments, then the grounded extension
can be obtained by iterative application to the empty set:
GE(AF) =
∞⋃
i=0
(
F i
)
.
We now deﬁne the characteristic function of an EAF. For reasons that will become apparent later, the domain of the function
is restricted to conﬂict free sets.
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characteristic function F of  is deﬁned as follows:
• F : 2ArgsC → 2Args ,
• F(S) = {A | A is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
From hereon, since we will always refer to an arbitrary but ﬁxed EAF, we will simply write F rather than F . As for
Dung frameworks, for any conﬂict free S ⊆ Args in  = (Args,R,D), S is admissible iff S ⊆ F (S), and complete iff S is a
ﬁxed point of F . We now deﬁne a procedure iteratively applying F to an EAF:
Deﬁnition 11. Deﬁne for any EAF (Args,R,D) the following sequence of subsets of Args.
• F 0 = ∅,
• F i+1 = F (F i).
However, an EAFs characteristic function F is not, in general, monotonic. For example, A is acceptable w.r.t. S =
{C,C1,C2} in Fig. 5c), but is not acceptable w.r.t. the conﬂict free {C,C1,C2, B1, B2}.
Since in general F is not monotonic, existence of a least ﬁxed point is not guaranteed. However Proposition 6 states
that each F i in Deﬁnition 11 is conﬂict free (hence F can be applied iteratively), and that the sequence is monotonically
increasing under ⊆.
Proposition 6. Let F be the characteristic function of an EAF, and F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then ∀i, F i ⊆ F i+1 and F i is conﬂict free.
Hence, rather than deﬁne the grounded extension as the least ﬁxed point, the grounded extension of a ﬁnitary EAF is
deﬁned in terms of the sequence in Deﬁnition 11.
Deﬁnition 12. (Args,R,D) is ﬁnitary iff ∀A ∈ Args, the set {B | (B, A) ∈ R} is ﬁnite, and ∀(A, B) ∈ R, the set {C | (C, (A, B)) ∈
D} is ﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 13. Let  be a ﬁnitary EAF and F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then ⋃∞i=0(F i) is the grounded extension GE() of .
It should be obvious to see that the grounded extension of any EAF (Args,R,D) will contain any argument that is not
attacked (i.e. the set {X | ¬∃Y , (Y , X) ∈ R}). The following example illustrates that in general it does not hold that the
grounded extension is a subset of the sceptically justiﬁed arguments under the preferred semantics (a result that does hold
for Dung frameworks).
Example 4. C ⇀ B ⇀ A, B (C ⇀ B).
The ‘self reinstating argument’ B is excluded when adopting a ‘constructivist’ approach: F 1 = {C}, F 2 = {C, A}, F 3 =
{C, A} is the grounded extension. However, adopting a ‘declarative’ perspective, {C}, {C, A} and {C, B} are admissible, and
{C, A} and {C, B} the preferred extensions. Hence, only C is sceptically justiﬁed under the preferred semantics. The grounded
semantics excludes self-reinstating arguments such as B , and so gives justiﬁed status to arguments such as A.
To conclude, we have extended Dung’s theory of argumentation to accommodate metalevel arguments that express
preferences between arguments. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung’s approach, and based on a
novel notion of acceptability that additionally requires reinstatement of defeats, deﬁnes the extensional semantics in the
same way (apart from the grounded semantics) as for a Dung framework. We have also shown that some of the basic
results that hold of the extensional semantics for Dung frameworks, also hold for the extended frameworks. We therefore
suggest that applications and developments of Dung’s work can be readily modiﬁed to accommodate argumentation about
preferences. For example, game based proof theories (e.g., [15,37]) and dialogue models that build on these games (e.g., [33]),
make core use of the notion of reinstatement encoded in the acceptability calculus. Notice also, that Proposition 4 implies
that (as with Dung’s theory) when deﬁning games for determining the credulous acceptance of an argument, it will suﬃce
to show that A belongs to an admissible extension rather than having to construct a preferred extension containing A.
Finally, note that while in general the characteristic function of an EAF is not monotonic, the following two sections study
two special classes of EAF whose characteristic functions are monotonic.
5. Value based argumentation in hierarchical extended argumentation frameworks
In this section we study a special class of EAF – hierarchical EAFs – and then show how Bench-Capon’s value based
argumentation [11] can be formalised in hierarchical EAFs, and extended to integrate metalevel reasoning about values and
value orderings.
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and metalevel arguments expressing preferences over the object level arguments. In hierarchical EAFs, the argumentation
is ‘stratiﬁed’ into levels so that, intuitively, each level is a Dung framework in which all binary attacks are restricted to
arguments within the framework. These binary attacks are then attacked by defence attacks that exclusively originate from
arguments expressing preferences in the immediate metalevel.
Deﬁnition 14.  = (Args,R,D) is a hierarchical EAF iff there exists a partition H = (((Args1,R1),D1), . . . , ((Args j,R j),D j),
. . .) such that:
• Args=⋃∞i=1 Argsi , R =
⋃∞
i=1 Ri , D =
⋃∞
i=1 Di , and for i = 1 . . .∞, (Argsi,Ri) is a Dung argumentation framework.• (C, (A, B)) ∈ Di implies (A, B) ∈ Ri , C ∈ Argsi+1.
 is a bounded hierarchical EAF iff its partition H is of the form (((Args1,R1),D1), . . . , ((Argsn,Rn),Dn)), where Dn = ∅.
The characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF satisﬁes monotonicity:
Proposition 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF (Args,R,D). Let S and S ′ be conﬂict free subsets
of Args such that S ⊆ S ′ . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ′).
If F ’s domain were not restricted to conﬂict free sets then F would not be monotonic. Consider the following counter-
example that assumes an unrestricted domain:
Example 5. Let  = C  B ⇀ A, E ⇀ D , D (C ⇀ B).
A ∈ F ({C, E}) since although B →{C,E} A, we have C →{C,E} B for which there is a reinstatement set {C →{C,E}
B, E →{C,E} D}. However, A /∈ F ({C, E, D}) where {C, E, D} is not conﬂict free. B →{C,E,D} A but C {C,E,D} B .
The monotonicity of F guarantees existence of a least ﬁxed point.
Deﬁnition 15. The grounded extension of a bounded hierarchical EAF , denoted GE(), is the least ﬁxed point of its
characteristic function F .
Hence, as in the case of a Dung framework, the grounded extension can be approached, and under the ﬁnitary restric-
tion be obtained, by iterative application to the empty set. Note that Proposition 6 implies that the iteration deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 11 is indeed possible, i.e., that each F i is conﬂict free.
Proposition 8. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a bounded hierarchical EAF, F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then:
1.
⋃∞
i=0(F i) ⊆ GE().
2. If  is ﬁnitary, then
⋃∞
i=0(F i) = GE().
The extended argumentation theory provides a unifying framework in which to formalise and extend works that augment
Dung’s framework with preferences [3,11]. In support of this claim we formalise and extend value based argumentation in
hierarchical EAFs. Firstly, we recall [11]’s value based argumentation:
Deﬁnition 16. 〈Args,R, V ,val, P 〉 is a value-based argumentation framework (VAF), where val is a function from Args to a
non-empty set of values V , and P is a set {a1, . . . ,an}, where each ai names a total ordering (audience) >ai on V × V .
An audience speciﬁc VAF (aVAF) is a 5-tuple 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉 where a ∈ P .
Deﬁnition 17. Let 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉 be an aVAF. Then A ∈ Args defeatsa B ∈ Args iff (A, B) ∈ R and it is not the case that
val(B) >a val(A).
We say that (A, B) ∈ Ra iff A defeatsa B .
The extensions and justiﬁed arguments of an aVAF Γ = 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉 are those of the Dung framework (Args,Ra).
Symmetric attacks in Γ are thus resolved to obtain asymmetric defeats in (Args,Ra), and (as discussed in Section 3)
asymmetric attacks may be removed so that if A asymmetrically attacks B , but B ’s value is ordered (by audience >a)
above A’s value, then neither argument defeatsa each other, and so both may appear in the same extension. [11] shows
that if for every (A, B) ∈ R either val(A) >a val(B) or val(B) >a val(A), and assuming no cycles in the same value in Γ ,
then there is guaranteed to be a unique, non-empty preferred extension of Γ , and a polynomial time algorithm to ﬁnd
it. Thus, for problematic odd cycles such as A ⇀ B ⇀ C ⇀ A which only yield ∅ as an admissible extension of a Dung
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framework, then if A, B and C do not promote the same value, any audience derived defeat relation will yield a single
preferred extension.
Reasoning about values and value orderings can be accommodated by formalising value based argumentation in a hi-
erarchical EAF in which the ﬁrst level includes the arguments and attacks in an aVAF. Pairwise orderings on values in V
are value preference arguments in the second level, so that if v1, v2 ∈ V then ‘v1 > v2’ and ‘v2 > v1’ are value preference
arguments that attack each other in the second level (see Fig. 6a)). If level 1 arguments A and B respectively promote v1
and v2, and B ⇀ A, then (v1 > v2) (B ⇀ A). Finally, an audience is represented by a level 3 audience argument that
denotes a choice of ordering, and thus defence attacks the binary attacks between value preference arguments. Thus,
v1|v2 ((v2 > v1) ⇀ (v1 > v2)), where v1|v2 is a level 3 argument representing an audience that selects v1> v2. Now,
the unique preferred extension of the EAF in Fig. 6a) is {A, v1 > v2, v1|v2}. In this way, we can represent the meta-level
reasoning required to ﬁnd the preferred extension of an aVAF.
Deﬁnition 18. Let Γ be an aVAF 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉. Then the EAF
 = (Args1∪ Args2∪ Args3,R1∪ R2∪ R3,D1∪ D2∪ D3)
is deﬁned as follows:
1. Args1= Args, R1= R.
2. {v > v ′ | v, v ′ ∈ V , v = v ′} ⊆ Args2,
{(v > v ′, v ′ > v) | v > v ′, v ′ > v ∈ Args2} ⊆ R2.
3. {a} ⊆ Args3, ∅ ⊆ R3.
4. – {(v > v ′, (A, B)) | (A, B) ∈ R1,val(B) = v, val(A) = v ′} ⊆ D1 (i.e., value preference arguments in Args2 defence attack
attacks between arguments in Args1);
– {(a, (v > v ′, v ′ > v)) | a ∈ Args3, (v > v ′, v ′ > v) ∈ R2, v ′ >a v} ⊆ D2 (i.e., audience arguments in Args3 defence
attack attacks between value preference arguments in Args2);
– D3= ∅ (the framework is bounded).
If in 2, 3 and 4, the ⊆ relation is replaced by =, then Γ and  are said to be equivalent.
Proposition 9. Let Γ = 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉 be an aVAF and  its equivalent EAF. Let s ∈ {preferred, grounded, complete}. Then ∀A ∈
Args, A is a sceptically, respectively credulously, justiﬁed argument of Γ under the s semantics, iff A is a sceptically, respectively
credulously, justiﬁed argument of  under the s semantics.
Notice that  is deﬁned so that one could additionally consider other arguments and attacks in levels 2 and 3. For
example, arguments in level 2 that directly attack value preference arguments, or arguments in level 3 representing different
audiences.
Indeed, given a VAF 〈Args,R, V ,val, P 〉, then its EAF is obtained as in Deﬁnition 18, except that now {a | a ∈ P } ⊆ Args3
(recall that P is the set of all possible audiences). A VAF and its obtained EAF are then said to be equivalent if {a | a ∈ P } =
Args3. Notice that if for any a,a′ ∈ P , (a, (v > v ′, v ′ > v)), (a′, (v ′ > v, v > v ′)) ∈ D2, then it follows from the deﬁnition
of an EAF (Deﬁnition 4) that a and a′ attack each other, i.e. (a,a′), (a′,a) ∈ R3. Since each possible audience argument
corresponds to a different total ordering on values, and ∀v, v ′ ∈ V , v > v ′ and v ′ > v are value preference arguments
in Args2, then every audience argument will R3 attack every other audience argument. Intuitively, a level 1 argument in
the EAF will then be sceptically justiﬁed under the preferred semantics iff it is objectively accepted [11] (justiﬁed irrespective
of the chosen audience) in the corresponding VAF. A level 1 argument will be credulously justiﬁed iff it is subjectively
accepted [11] (justiﬁed for at least one chosen audience). Of course, given representation of multiple audiences, one can in
912 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934principle incorporate a fourth level to model argumentation over preferences between audiences.3 Notice, that an audience
argument is not necessarily restricted to instantiation by the value ordering that constitutes the audience, but may be
instantiated by some justiﬁcation for the ordering that is the claim of the argument. Furthermore, Deﬁnition 18 also allows
for arguments that express preferences that are not derived on the basis of value orderings. We now illustrate the above
ideas with an example of value based argumentation over action.
Example 6. In what follows, we assume instantiation of level 1 arguments about actions (A1, A2, A3 in Fig. 6b)) in a BDI
logic, as described in [8]. A1 and A2 are arguments for the medical actions ‘give aspirin’ and ‘give chlopidogrel’ respectively.
These arguments relate the current beliefs that warrant (are preconditions for) the actions bringing about states of affairs
that realise a desired goal and so appeal to a value. Both A1 and A2 appeal to the value of improving the patient’s health.
They symmetrically attack since they claim alternative actions for the goal of preventing blood clotting.
In [27] we describe construction of level 2 arguments that claim preferences between level 1 arguments based on the
relative degree of promotion of a desired value by the level 1 arguments. Thus, B1 is an argument based on clinical trial 1’s
conclusion that A2’s chlopidogrel is more eﬃcacious than A1’s aspirin at preventing blood clotting. Hence B1 (A1⇀ A2).
Suppose also B2 based on clinical trial 2’s conclusion that the opposite is the case. Hence B1 B2. At this stage neither A1
or A2 are sceptically justiﬁed under any semantics. However C1 claims that trial 1 is preferred to trial 2 since the former
uses a more statistically robust design. Now A2 and not A1 is sceptically justiﬁed.
However, A3 appealing to the value of cost, states that chlopidogrel is prohibitively expensive and so asymmetrically
attacks A2. B3 is the value preference argument ordering improving the patient’s health over cost, and B4 the value preference
argument ordering cost over improving the patient’s health. Now, neither A2 or A1 are sceptically justiﬁed (notice that now
there is a preferred extension containing B3, A2 and A3). Finally, C2 is an audience argument that selects B4’s value
preference over B3. This choice is justiﬁed by appealing to the utilitarian principle: since ﬁnancial resources are low, and
chlopidogrel is costly, then use of chlopidogrel will compromise treatment of other patients, and so one should preferentially
order cost over improving the patient’s health (such a trade off is often made in medical contexts). Hence, A3’s attack on A2
succeeds, and so A1 is now sceptically justiﬁed; aspirin is now the preferred course of action.
In this section we have integrated metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings in a hierarchical EAF. The
question naturally arises as to whether it is always possible, or indeed desirable, to stratify argumentation according to the
hierarchical prescription. Pragmatically, it may well be computationally expensive to ensure that for a given knowledge base,
the arguments and attacks deﬁned conform to the hierarchical restriction. Philosophically, a bounded hierarchical model
assumes a highest level of reasoning in which knowledge is certain and so immune to doubt and conﬂict. For example, for
value based argumentation, a three level hierarchical framework assumes that preferences over value orderings (audiences)
are given, and not themselves subject to reasoning. To avoid such an assumption, while avoiding having to ascend levels
to inﬁnity, one can appeal to the intuition that our metalevel reasoning is often informed by our object level reasoning;
argumentation at lower levels may thus impact on argumentation at higher levels. As Searle puts it [36], values are often
the product of practical reasoning rather than an input to it. Indeed, we refer the reader to an intuitive illustration of
non-hierarchical extended argumentation in Example 14 (Section 7).
6. Preference symmetric extended argumentation frameworks
This section focuses on preference symmetric EAFs in which only attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments can
be attacked by arguments expressing preferences. This restriction is satisﬁed by formalisms in which all attacks between
arguments are symmetric (e.g. [16]), and formalisms in which asymmetric attacks succeed as defeats irrespective of prefer-
ences between arguments. An example of the latter is the argument based logic programming formalism in [34], in which
A asymmetrically attacks B iff A claims (proves) what was assumed non-provable (through negation as failure) by a rule
in B . This attack succeeds as a defeat irrespective of whether B is preferred to A. The formalism of [34] will be described
and formalised as an instance of a preference symmetric EAF in Section 7.
Deﬁnition 19.  = (Args,R,D) is a preference symmetric EAF iff: if (C, (B, A)) ∈ D, then (A, B) ∈ R.
No conﬂict free set and so admissible extension S of a preference symmetric EAF (ps-EAF)  can contain arguments that
attack each other. Suppose such a set. Then by Deﬁnition 6, if for A, B ∈ S , (B, A) ∈ R, then ∃C ∈ S such that (C, (B, A)) ∈ D,
and (A, B) /∈ R, contradicting  is a ps-EAF.
As already noted, value based argumentation does not conform to the restriction imposed by ps-EAFs. Hence, it may be
that (B, A) ∈ R and yet B and A both appear in an admissible extension and are both justiﬁed. As discussed in Section 3 and
illustrated in Example 6, this may be appropriate when applying argumentation to practical reasoning, where an argument
for an action may be accepted while acknowledging the validity of a challenge represented by an asymmetrically attacking
3 One could in this way express constraints on value preferences that effectively identify classes of audiences; for example an argument preferring
audiences that order religious over secular values will denote the religious class of audiences.
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Pollock’s argumentation system [32] in which if B ‘Pollock undercuts’ A, and A is preferred to B , then B does not defeat A.
The standard example describes A to be an argument claiming that an object is red, given that it looks red and the rule
that things that look red are red. This argument is undercut (the application of the rule is invalidated) by an argument B
claiming that the object is illuminated by red light. Now, if A is preferred to B , then A and B may both be justiﬁed. This is
somewhat strange; that one should accept together an argument that makes use of a rule, and an argument that invalidates
use of the rule.4 We suggest that the Pollock undercut be reformulated, either as a symmetric attack, or as an asymmetric
attack that succeeds as a defeat irrespective of the relative preference.
Note that we do not claim that the only way to ensure that attacking arguments do not appear in the same admissible
extension is by requiring that the arguments and attacks instantiate a ps-EAF. It may well be that this property is satisﬁed
given the way in which arguments, attacks and preferences are deﬁned in the underlying logic. For example, preference
based argumentation frameworks [3] are instantiated by arguments deﬁned on the basis of a propositional knowledge base.
Only asymmetric attacks are deﬁned, and a preference relation on arguments may result in the removal of these attacks.
However, in [2] it is shown that if the preference relation applied satisﬁes some intuitively desirable properties, then no
two arguments with contradictory propositions will be jointly justiﬁed.
We now present some results that hold for preference symmetric EAFs. Firstly, recall our motivation of the deﬁnition of
acceptability for EAFs in Section 4.1. We proposed a deﬁnition of acceptability (Ac1) that is more formally deﬁned here as
‘preference symmetric’, or ps, acceptability.
Deﬁnition 20. Let (Args,R,D) be a EAF. Then for any S ⊆ Args:
1. C →S B is reinstated iff ∀D ∈ Args s.t. (D, (C, B)) ∈ D there is a E ∈ S s.t. E →S D .
2. A ∈ Args is ps acceptable w.r.t. S iff ∀B ∈ Args such that B →S A, there is a C ∈ S such that C →S B , and C →S B is
reinstated.
We saw that when evaluating the acceptability of A1 w.r.t. S in Fig. 5b), ps acceptability does not suﬃce. We are required
to not only check that A1 →S B1 is reinstated, but also A2 →S B2, since otherwise S would be admissible, and inclusion
of the acceptable B3 in S would result in an S ′ that is not admissible. However, the requirement that one checks for
reinstatement of A2 →S B2 would not arise if B2 ⇀ A2, as would be the case in a ps-EAF. This is because S would not
be admissible, since A2 would not be acceptable w.r.t. S (under ps acceptability or the more general deﬁnition). Indeed, ps
acceptability and the general deﬁnition of acceptability in Deﬁnition 8 coincide for ps-EAFs, in the sense that:
Proposition 10. Let (Args,R,D) be a preference symmetric EAF. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args. Then, every argument in S is
ps acceptable w.r.t. S iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proposition 10 implies that extensional semantics for ps-EAFs can equivalently be deﬁned on the basis of ps acceptability.
Furthermore, the characteristic function of a ps-EAF is monotonic. We can therefore deﬁne the grounded extension of a ps-
EAF in terms of its characteristic function’s least ﬁxed point, and under the ﬁnitary restriction obtain the grounded extension
by iterative application to the empty set.
Proposition 11. Let F be the characteristic function of a preference symmetric EAF (Args,R,D). Let S and S ′ be conﬂict free subsets
of Args such that S ⊆ S ′ . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ′).
Deﬁnition 21. The grounded extension of a preference symmetric EAF , denoted GE(), is the least ﬁxed point of its
characteristic function F .
Proposition 12. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a preference symmetric EAF, F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then:
1.
⋃∞
i=0(F i) ⊆ GE().
2. If  is ﬁnitary, then
⋃∞
i=0(F i) = GE().
Example 7. For  in Fig. 7, F1 = {A, H}, F2 = {A, H,G}, F3 = {A, H,G,C}, F4 = {A, H,G,C, E} where F (F4) = F4 is the
grounded extension.
We now show that the grounded extension of a ps-EAF can be obtained on the basis of ‘strict acceptability’ (recall the
deﬁnition of strict defeatS given in Deﬁnition 5):
4 Notice that in the usual formalisation of Pollock undercuts, A’s rule is represented as a defeasible implication α ⇒ β (where α and β are wff in some
ﬁrst order language) and B ’s claim is of the form ¬(α ⇒ β).
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Deﬁnition 22. Let S ⊆ Args in (Args,R,D). Then A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S iff ∀B s.t. B defeatsS A, ∃C ∈ S s.t. C strictly
defeatsS B .
Deﬁnition 23. Let  = (Args,R,D), S ⊆ Args, and 2ArgsC denote the set of all conﬂict free subsets of Args. The characteristic
function Fst of  is deﬁned as:
• Fst : 2ArgsC → 2Args .
• Fst(S) = {A | A is strictly acceptable w.r.t. S}.
Deﬁne for any EAF the following sequence of subsets of Args.
• F∗0 = ∅.
• F∗i+1 = Fst(F∗i).
Proposition 13 states that for a ps-EAF, the iteration obtained by the characteristic function F based on the standard
deﬁnition of acceptability, is the same as the iteration obtained by Fst based on strict acceptability. This implies that the
grounded extension of a ﬁnitary ps-EAF is given by
⋃∞
i=0(F∗i).
Proposition 13. Let  be a preference symmetric EAF, and let F i be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 11, F∗i deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 23. Then
F∗i = F i .
Referring to the ps-EAF in Example 7, one can see that each argument in F i+1–F i is strictly acceptable w.r.t. F i . For
example, E is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F3: D defeatsF 3 E , and since G ∈ F3, then D does not defeatF 3 C , and so C strictly
defeatsF 3 D .
7. Formalising logic programming with defeasible priorities in an extended argumentation framework
Extended argumentation provides an abstract characterisation of preference application while retaining the basic concep-
tual machinery of Dung. We therefore propose that it provides a semantics for object level non-monotonic formalisms that
accommodate defeasible reasoning about preferences (e.g. [14,24,34]). Arguments and attacks deﬁned by these formalisms
can instantiate an EAF and the justiﬁed arguments under all of Dung’s semantics can be evaluated. In this section we show
how the inferences obtained in Prakken and Sartor’s argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities (ALP-DP)
[34], equate with the claims of justiﬁed arguments of a preference symmetric EAF instantiated by arguments and attacks
deﬁned by an ALP-DP theory. Furthermore, unlike [34], one can then determine the justiﬁed arguments of an ALP-DP theory
under all of Dung’s extensional semantics.
7.1. Deﬁning arguments on the basis of an ALP-DP theory
In ALP-DP, arguments are chained sequences of named logic program rules. The head of a rule can express a priority
ordering on the names of other rules. Hence, given arguments A1 and A2, one can identify ‘priority’ arguments B1, B2, . . .
such that an ordering on rules in A1 and A2 is deﬁned by the heads of rules in B1, B2, . . . . One can then deﬁne a preference
relation  on A1 and A2 based on the ordering claimed by B1, B2, . . . . In ALP-DP, rules are defeasible or strict, where only
the former express debatable information.
Deﬁnition 24. An ALP-DP theory is a tuple (S, D), where:
– S is a set of strict rules of the form s : L0 ∧ · · · ∧ Lm → Ln;
– D is a set of defeasible rules r : L0 ∧ · · · ∧ L j∧∼ Lk ∧ · · ·∧∼ Lm ⇒ Ln , and:
• Each rule name r (s) is a ﬁrst order term.
• Each Li is a strong literal, i.e., an atomic ﬁrst order formula, or such a formula preceded by strong negation ¬.
• Each ∼ Li is a weak literal, where Li is a strong literal, and ∼ denotes negation as failure, so that ∼ Li is read as “there
is no evidence that Li is the case”.
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sequent Ln of the rule named r. Also, for any atom A, we say that A and ¬A are the complement of each other. In the
metalanguage, L denotes the complement of a literal L. The language is assumed to contain a two-place predicate symbol ≺
for expressing priorities on rule names. To ensure that ≺ is a strict partial order, the strict rules S are always assumed to
contain the following:
• o1 : (x ≺ y) ∧ (y ≺ z) → (x ≺ z);
• o2 : (x ≺ y) ∧ ¬(x≺ z) → ¬(y ≺ z);
• o3 : (y ≺ z) ∧ ¬(x≺ z) → ¬(x ≺ y);
• o4 : (x ≺ y) → ¬(y ≺ x).
Deﬁnition 25. An argument A based on the theory (S, D) is:
1. a ﬁnite sequence s = [r0, . . . , rn] of ground instances of rules such that:
(a) for every i (0 i  n), for every strong literal L in the antecedent of ri there is a k < i such that head(rk) = L.
If head(rn) = x≺ y then A is called a ‘singleton priority argument’
(b) no two distinct rules in the sequence have the same head
or:
2. a ﬁnite sequence [s1, . . . , sn], such that for i = 1 . . .n, si is a singleton priority argument. A is said to be a ‘composite
priority argument’ that concludes the ordering
⋃n
i=1 head(ri), where r1, . . . , rn are, respectively, the last rules in the
singleton priority arguments s1, . . . , sn .
An argument A is based on the theory (S, D) iff all rules in A are in S ∪ D . In the deﬁnitions that follow we assume that
arguments are relative to a theory (S, D).
Deﬁnition 25-1(a) says that arguments formed by chaining rules can ignore weak literals. Deﬁnition 25-1(b) prevents
arguments from containing circular chains of reasoning. In [34], arguments are exclusively deﬁned by 25-1. Preferences
between arguments are then parameterised w.r.t. a set T , based on the ordering claimed by the set of singleton priority
arguments in T . In this paper, we have additionally deﬁned composite priority arguments in 25-2, so that an ordering,
and hence a preference, is claimed by a single argument. This is the only modiﬁcation we introduce to ALP-DP as deﬁned
in [34]. From hereon, to enhance readability we will describe only propositional examples, and as an abuse of notation write
arguments as sequences of rule names rather than the rules that the names identify.
Example 8. Let S = {o1, . . . ,o4} and D the set of rules:
r1 :⇒ a, r2 :⇒ ¬a, r3 :a ⇒ b, r4 :¬a ⇒ ¬b,
r5 :⇒ r2≺ r1, r6 :⇒ r1≺ r2, r7 :⇒ r4≺ r3, r8 :⇒ r6≺ r5.
Amongst the arguments that can be constructed are:
A1= [r1], A2= [r2], A3= [r1, r3], A4= [r2, r4], B1= [r5], B2= [r6], B3= [r5, r7],
B4= [r6, r7], B5= [r7], C1= [r8].
Note that B3 is a composite argument concluding the ordering r2≺ r1, r4≺ r3.
Example 9. Let S = {o1, . . . ,o4} and D the set of rules:
1 :∼ b ⇒ a, r2 :⇒ b, r3 :b ⇒ ¬a, r4 :⇒ r3≺ r1.
Amongst the arguments that can be constructed are:
A1= [r1], A2= [r2], A3= [r2, r3], B1= [r4].
In [34] the following is deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 26. For any arguments A, A′ and literal L:
• A is strict iff it does not contain any defeasible rule; it is defeasible otherwise.
• A′ is a sub-argument of A iff A′ is a subsequence of A.
• L is a conclusion of A iff L is the head of some rule in A.
• L is an assumption of A iff ∼ L occurs in some antecedent of a rule in A.
• If T is a sequence of rules, then A + T is the concatenation of A and T .
• By deﬁnition, A = [ ] is an argument of any ALP-DP theory, and is referred to as the empty argument.
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In [34], the authors motivate deﬁnition of attacks between arguments that account for the ways in which arguments can
be extended with strict rules:
Deﬁnition 27. A1 attacks A2 iff there are sequences S1 and S2 of strict rules such that A1 + S1 is an argument with
conclusion L and
1. A2+ S2 is an argument with a conclusion L, in which case A1 and A2 are said to symmetrically conclusion–conclusion
attack on the pair (L, L); or
2. A2 is an argument with an assumption L, in which case A1 is said to undercut A2 on the pair (L, L).
Example 10. In Example 8, B3 = [r5, r7] and B4 = [r6, r7] conclusion–conclusion attack since [r5, r7] has the conclusion
r2≺ r1 and [r6, r7] + [o4] has the conclusion ¬(r2≺ r1). Also, A3 and A4 conclusion–conclusion attack on the pairs (a,¬a)
and (b,¬b). In Example 9, A1 and A3 symmetrically conclusion–conclusion attack on the pair (a,¬a), and both A2 and A3
undercut A1 on the pair (b,¬b).
In general, since arguments A and A′ can attack each other on more than one pair of conclusions, then there may
different sequences of strict rules that extend these arguments to account for the pairs of conclusions on which they attack.
Note that arguments can conclusion–conclusion attack or undercut themselves. For example, [r :∼ a ⇒ a] undercuts itself,
and [r1 :⇒ a, r2 :a ⇒ ¬a] conclusion–conclusion attacks itself.
Notation 2. A is incoherent iff A conclusion–conclusion attacks or undercuts itself.
In [34], a preference amongst conclusion–conclusion attacking arguments is based on a comparison of the sets of defea-
sible rules that contribute to derivation of the conﬂicting conclusions.
Deﬁnition 28. If A + S is an argument with conclusion L, the defeasible rules RL(A + S) relevant to L are:
1. {rd} iff A includes defeasible rule rd with head L,
2. RL1 (A + S) ∪ · · · ∪ RLn (A + S) iff A is defeasible and S includes a strict rule s : L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ln → L.
We deﬁne [34]’s ordering on the above sets, and hence preferences amongst arguments, w.r.t. an ordering concluded by
a single composite priority argument (rather than a set of singleton priority arguments as in [34]):
Deﬁnition 29. Let C be a priority argument concluding the ordering ≺. Let R and R ′ be sets of defeasible rules. Then R ′ > R
iff ∃r ∈ R s.t. ∀r′ , r′ ∈ R ′ implies r ≺ r′ .
Intuitively, R can be made better by replacing some rule in R with any rule in R ′ , while the reverse is impossible. Given
a priority ordering ≺ concluded by an argument C , we say that A is preferred≺ to B if for every pair (L, L′) on which they
conclusion–conclusion attack, the set of A’s defeasible rules relevant to L is stronger (>) than the set of B ’s defeasible rules
relevant to L′ .
Deﬁnition 30. Let C be a priority argument concluding ≺. Let (L1, L1), . . . , (Ln, Ln) be the pairs on which A and B
conclusion–conclusion attack, where for i = 1 . . .n, Li and Li are conclusions in A and B respectively. Then A is preferred≺
to B if for i = 1 . . .n, RLi (A + Si) > RLi (B + S ′i).
Example 11. In Example 8, B3 concludes r2 ≺ r1, r4 ≺ r3, and so Ra(A3) > R¬a(A4), Rb(A3) > R¬b(A4), and A3 is
preferred≺ to A4. In Example 9, B1 concludes r3≺ r1, and so Ra(A1) > R¬a(A3) and A1 is preferred≺ to A3.
Observe that:
1. If A and B are strict arguments that conclusion–conclusion attack (recall that they cannot undercut since strict rules
contain no weak literals) then the sets of relevant defeasible rules for the pairs of conclusions on which they attack are
obviously empty. Hence, it cannot be the case that A is preferred≺ to B , or B is preferred≺ to A, for any ordering ≺.
2. By Deﬁnition 29, R ′ > R whenever R ′ is empty and R is non-empty. Hence, if A is strict and B defeasible, and these
arguments conclusion–conclusion attack, then for any ordering ≺, A is preferred≺ to B .
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Prior to instantiating an EAF with ALP-DP arguments, we review [34]’s deﬁnition of the acceptability of arguments and
the grounded extension of an ALP-DP theory:
Deﬁnition 31. Let (S, D) be an ALP-DP theory. [34] deﬁnes:
1. Args to be the set of arguments as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 25-1.
2. A1 ∈ Args conclusion–conclusion or undercuts attacks A2 ∈ Args as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 27.
3. ∀T ⊆ Args, ≺T= {r ≺ s | r ≺ s is the conclusion of an argument in T }.
A ∈ Args is preferred≺T to B ∈ Args as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 30, except that ≺T is deﬁned as above rather than by a
single priority argument.
4. Let T ⊆ Args. Then A ∈ Args T -defeats B ∈ Args iff A is the empty argument and B is incoherent (attacks itself), or else
if
(a) A and B conclusion–conclusion attack and B does not undercut A and B is not preferred≺T to A; or
(b) A undercuts B .
5. A strictly T -defeats B if A T -defeats B and B does not T -defeat A.
6. A ∈ Args is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t T ⊆ Args if all arguments that T -defeat A are strictly T -defeated by an argument
in T .
7. Let T ⊆ Args be conﬂict free if no argument in T attacks an argument in T , and let 2ArgsC be the set of all conﬂict free
subsets of Args. Then:
• G : 2ArgsC → 2Args , G(T ) = {A | A is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t. T },
• G0 = ∅, Gi+1 = G(Gi).
8. If (S, D) is ﬁnitary, i.e., each argument in Args is attacked by at most a ﬁnite number of arguments, then the least ﬁxed
point of G (the grounded extension of (S, D)) is obtained by
⋃∞
i=0(Gi).
Observe that:
1. [34] obviate against the malign impact of incoherent arguments5 by having them defeated by the empty argument [ ].
We will adopt the same approach when instantiating an EAF. Thus, R will be deﬁned by the set of pairs (A, B) where
A undercuts or conclusion–conclusion attacks B , or where B is incoherent, in which case A = [ ].
2. If A undercut attacks B then A defeats B irrespective of their relative preference.6 Hence, only conclusion–conclusion
attacks will be subject to d-attack by preference arguments.
3. If A does not undercut B , A conclusion–conclusion attacks B , and in addition B undercuts A, then A cannot defeat
B (irrespective of the relative preference of A and B). The rationale for undercuts overriding conclusion–conclusion
attacks appeals to intuitions arising from the modelling of legal examples. The fact that B undercuts A effectively
means that the conclusion–conclusion attack from A to B cannot succeed as a defeat. This is modelled by the d-
attack [ ] (A ⇀ B), where, as we will show, the empty argument cannot be attacked and therefore defeated by any
argument.
Deﬁnition 32. The EAF (Args,R,D) for a theory (S, D) is deﬁned as follows.
1. Args is the set of arguments given by Deﬁnition 25.
2. R = R1∪ R2∪ R3, where:
(a) R1= {(A, B) | A undercuts B}.
(b) R2= {(A, B) | A conclusion–conclusion attacks B}.
(c) R3= {([ ], B) | (B, B) ∈ (R1∪ R2)}.
3. Let R′ = R − (R1∪ R3). Then ∀(A, B) ∈ R′:
(a) ∀C ∈ Args, if C concludes ≺ and B is preferred≺ to A then (C, (A, B)) ∈ D.
(b) if (B, A) ∈ R1 then ([ ], (A, B)) ∈ D.
Notice that R1 and R2 may not be disjoint. Hence, R′ excludes (from being subject to d-attack by preference arguments)
those conclusion–conclusion attacks (A, B) in R2 that are also undercut attacks (A, B) in R1. Also, by Deﬁnition 27, the
empty argument cannot participate in a conclusion–conclusion or undercut with any argument. This means that R3 is
necessarily disjoint from R1∪ R2. The following observations are shown to hold in Lemma 11 in Appendix A:
5 Suppose {A1, A2, . . . , An}, where A1 alone is incoherent, and no two distinct arguments in the set attack each other. A1 cannot be in a conﬂict free
set and so a stable extension. Hence, no stable extension exists, since no argument in {A2, . . . , An} attacks and so defeats A1. This is counter-intuitive. It’s
as if the incoherence of A1 has ‘infected’ the other arguments. However, by letting A1 be defeated by the empty argument, then {[ ], A2, . . . , An} is now a
stable extension.
6 This is justiﬁed by intuitions arising in the legal domain. However, in [34], the authors acknowledge that this may not be warranted in other domains.
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Remark 1. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for (S, D). Let A, B ∈ Args. Then:
1.  is preference symmetric.
2. If A undercuts B , then A defeatsS B for any S ⊆ Args.
3. If ([ ], (X, Y )) ∈ D then there does not exist a (Z , (Y , X)) ∈ D.
4. ([ ], B) ∈ R iff B is incoherent.
5. There is no B such that (B, [ ]) ∈ R.
6. If A does not undercut B , A conclusion–conclusion attacks B and B undercuts A, then A does not defeatS B for any
S ⊆ Args such that S contains [ ].
7. If A ∈ Args is incoherent, then A is not acceptable w.r.t. any S ⊆ Args.
Since the instantiated EAF is preference symmetric, its extensions can be obtained on the basis of ps acceptability. Note
that the requirement on EAFs that if (C, (A, B)), (C ′, (B, A)) ∈ D then (C,C ′), (C ′,C) ∈ R, is satisﬁed by Deﬁnition 32’s
instantiation of an EAF, given that:
Proposition 14. Let (Args,R,D) be the EAF for a theory (S, D). If (C, (A, B)), (C ′, (B, A)) ∈ D then C and C ′ conclusion–conclusion
attack.
Example 12. For Example 9, we obtain the ps-EAF shown in Fig. 8a), in which B1 cannot d-attack the attack from A3 to A1
since A3 undercuts A1. The undercut also means that the empty argument d-attacks the conclusion–conclusion attack
from A1 to A3. {A2, A3, B1, [ ]} is the single preferred/complete/stable/grounded extension.
Example 13. For Example 8 we obtain the EAF in Fig. 8b). {C1, B1, B3, B5, A1, A3} is a subset of the single grounded,
preferred, complete and stable extension E .
In general we can show that:
Proposition 15. Let  be the EAF for the ALP-DP theory (S, D). Then for s ∈ {grounded, complete, stable, preferred}, if A is sceptically,
respectively credulously, justiﬁed under the s semantics, then all sub-arguments of A are sceptically, respectively credulously, justiﬁed
under the s semantics.
The deﬁnition of ALP-DP acceptability in [34] (given here in Deﬁnition 31-6) requires that a reinstating argument strictly
defeat, and thus precludes deﬁnition of admissible and preferred extensions. To see why, suppose one deﬁned an admissible
extension as a conﬂict free set T whose members are ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. T . Consider then the theory (S, D) where
D = {r1 :⇒ a, r2 :⇒ ¬a}, and A = [r1], B = [r2]. A is not ALP-DP acceptable with respect to {A} since A does not strictly T -
defeat B . Also, B is not ALP-DP acceptable with respect to {B}. Hence neither can be deﬁned to be admissible (or preferred).
Both the instantiated Dung framework (A B) and the instantiated EAF both return {A} and {B} as admissible and preferred
extensions. Suppose ALP-DP-acceptability was weakened to:
A ∈ Args is ALP-DP2 acceptable w.r.t. T ⊆ Args if all arguments that T -defeat A are T -defeated by an argument in T .
Then, if in addition to r1 and r2 the aforementioned theory also contained r3 :⇒ r1 ≺ r2, A and C = [r3] would be ALP-
DP2 acceptable with respect to {A}, but A would not be ALP-DP2 acceptable with respect to {A,C}, i.e., {A,C} would not
be admissible. That is, Dung’s fundamental lemma would not hold. As already discussed in Section 4.1, one would want
that any deﬁnition of acceptability ensure satisfaction of the fundamental lemma. Also, the properties of admissible and
preferred extensions described in Proposition 4 and all that is implied by this proposition (including Corollary 1) would
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admissible extensions and the justiﬁed status of ALP-DP arguments under the preferred semantics.
Example 14. Consider a theory’s arguments: A = [guardian :⇒ sky ≺ bbc], B = [sun :⇒ bbc ≺ sky], C = [bbc :⇒ sun ≺
guardian], D = [sky :⇒ guardian ≺ sun], where x :⇒ y ≺ z is interpreted as x is the source for the claim that y is less
trustworthy than z.
We obtain the non-hierarchical EAF in Example 3 (see Fig. 4). Recall the observation that no two arguments defeatS
each other in S = {A,C, B, D}. Hence, if we had deﬁned a conﬂict free set as one in which no two arguments defeat
each other, then {A,C, B, D} would be the single preferred extension. This strikes us as counter-intuitive; that one should
simultaneously hold as justiﬁed, arguments that claim contradictory preferences. As it is, we have that ∅ is the grounded
extension, and {A,C}, {B, D} the preferred extensions, each of which represent the mutually supportive media outlets; we
can either adopt a ‘sky and sun’ perspective on the world, or a ‘guardian and bbc’ perspective on the world.
We conclude with a result relating the grounded extension of an ALP-DP theory as deﬁned in [34], to the grounded
extension of the theory’s EAF. In [34], the grounded extension of a ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory is the least ﬁxed point of the
theory’s characteristic function (as described in Deﬁnition 31-8). However, a ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory does not necessarily
yield a ﬁnitary EAF (recall the deﬁnition of a ﬁnitary EAF in Deﬁnition 12). It may be that in the theory’s EAF, an attack
between two conclusion–conclusion attacking arguments may be d-attacked by an inﬁnite number of arguments.
Example 15. Let D in (S, D) be the inﬁnite set of defeasible rules:
{m :⇒ a, n :⇒ ¬a, p :⇒m ≺ n} ∪ {rX :⇒ rX+1 ≺ rX+2 | X is a positive integer}.
Let A = [m], B = [n], C0 = [p], and C1 = C0 + [r1], C2 = C0 + [r2], . . . .
The theory’s non-ﬁnitary EAF is A B , where for i = 0,1,2, . . . , Ci (A ⇀ B).
Hence, we will only consider ALP-DP theories that contain a ﬁnite set of rules deriving a priority relation.
Deﬁnition 33. (S, D) is priority-ﬁnitary iff
• {r | r ∈ D, head(r) = r′ ≺ r′′} is ﬁnite.
• Any argument in Args is attacked by at most a ﬁnite number of arguments in Args (where Args and attack are deﬁned
in Deﬁnitions 25 and 27 respectively).
Proposition 16. If (S, D) is priority-ﬁnitary then its EAF  = (Args,R,D) is ﬁnitary.
Proposition 17 states that the grounded extension of a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory as deﬁned in [34], is the same,
modulo the composite priority arguments, as the grounded extension of the theory’s EAF. That is to say, the grounded extension
of the theory’s EAF differs only in the contained composite priority arguments.
Deﬁnition 34. The sets of arguments S and S ′ are said to be equivalent modulo composite priority arguments, iff:
1. S ′ ⊆ S .
2. if A ∈ S , A /∈ S ′ then A is a composite priority argument constructed from the singleton priority arguments A1, . . . , An ,
where n > 1, and for i = 1 . . .n, Ai ∈ S ′ (and so Ai ∈ S given 1).
Proposition 17. Let (S, D) be a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory, and let GE((S, D)) be the grounded extension of (S, D) as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 31-8. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the theory’s EAF and GE() the grounded extension of . Then GE() and GE((S, D)) are
equivalent modulo the composite priority arguments.
8. Related work
The formalisms of Prakken and Sartor [34] and Kakas and Moraitis [24], both construct arguments from logic program-
ming rules, where these rules may express priorities over other rules. Our work can be viewed as a generalisation of these
approaches in that we abstract from the underlying logic and the criteria used for determining preferences. Furthermore,
these formalisms do not straightforwardly conform to application of Dung’s acceptability calculus, whereas our approach
allows for such application, through provision of an abstract characterisation of preference application while retaining the
basic conceptual machinery of Dung. We have already shown how arguments deﬁned by an ALP-DP theory instantiate a
preference symmetric framework, so that unlike [34], one can deﬁne extensions under the admissible and preferred seman-
tics.
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tion, but without negation as failure. P denotes the set of rules with heads that are of the form hp(r, r′) expressing that r
has higher priority than r′ , where r and r′ name rules in T ∪ P . An argument is a pair (T , P ) such that T ⊆ T , P ⊆ P and
(T , P ) derives (by application of modus ponens) some literal L (T ∪ P  L) (notice that (T , P ) may derive more than one
literal, and so may contain multiple sets of rules chained through modus ponens). Then, (T , P ) symmetrically conﬂicts with
(T ′, P ′) iff T ∪ P  L and T ′ ∪ P ′  ¬L (where L and ¬L may be contradictory priorities on rules). It is the attack relation that
accounts for the priorities over rules, so that (T ′, P ′) attacks (T , P ) iff they conﬂict on some L and ¬L, and such that the
minimal subset T1 ∪ P1 of T ′ ∪ P ′ used to derive L is preferred to (in the sense of being ‘at least as strong as’) the minimal
subset T2 ∪ P2 of T ∪ P used to derive ¬L. We refer the reader to [24] for how such a preference is deﬁned; suﬃce it to
say that the preference for (T1, P1) over (T2, P2) is based on the (T ′, P ′) derived relative priorities of rules in (T1, P1) and
(T2, P2). Let us here isolate the ‘preference argument’ (T ′p, P ′p) (T ′p ⊆ T ′ , P ′p ⊆ P ′) that minimally derives these priorities.
[24] deﬁnes the admissibility of an argument (T , P ):
(T , P ) is admissible iff it is conﬂict free, and for any (T ′, P ′) that attacks (T , P ), (T , P ) attacks (T ′, P ′).
This deﬁnition equates with our deﬁnition of admissibility. Informally, one can see how to instantiate a preference symmet-
ric EAF: by enumerating all (T ,P) deﬁned arguments that are only comprised of single sets of chained rules (as in [34]);
identifying preference arguments; deﬁning R in terms of [24]’s symmetric conﬂict relation, and; deﬁning D attacks from
preference arguments to R attacks, corresponding to [24]’s deﬁnition of attack. Then, one can see that (T , P ) is admissi-
ble in [24] iff S = {(T1, P1), . . . , (Tn, Pn)} is admissible in the instantiated EAF (where T = ⋃ni=1 Ti , P =
⋃n
i=1 Pi). Notice,
that acceptability of a single argument with respect to set of arguments (and so articulation of a Dung style acceptability
calculus and characteristic function) is not deﬁned in [24]. Acceptability would need to be derived from the deﬁnition of
admissibility, i.e., (T , P ) is acceptable w.r.t. (T ′, P ′) if (T ′ ∪ T , P ′ ∪ P ) is admissible. This imposes stronger requirements
than our deﬁnitions of acceptability and ps acceptability, neither of which would require showing that all arguments in
(T ′ ∪ T , P ′ ∪ P ) are acceptable w.r.t. (T ′ ∪ T , P ′ ∪ P ) (as highlighted at the end of Section 4.1).
Other non-monotonic formalisms that enable reasoning about preferences, but that do not employ concepts from argu-
mentation theory, include [14] and [17]. For example, [17] make use of a preference operator ⊗, so that a defeasible rule
such as ¬sun_shining ⇒ raining⊗ snowing expresses that if it is believed that the sun is not shining, then it is believed that
it is raining; but if it is not raining then it is believed that is snowing. Given that the sun is not shining, one can see how
the defeasible rule could be used in the construction of an argument A1 claiming that it is raining, and a symmetrically
attacking argument A2 claiming that it is snowing, and an argument expressing a default preference for A1 over A2. If it
turns out to be the case that it is not raining, this would constitute an argument defeating A1, so that A2 would now be
reinstated.
We conclude by mentioning the work of [10], in which argument frameworks are similarly extended to allow attacks on
attacks. In this way, the strength of one argument’s attack on another can be modiﬁed by another argument. The authors
then describe how the strengths of arguments can propagate through the framework. However, this work does not address
the issue of how to deﬁne the status of arguments under Dung’s semantics.
9. Conclusions
This paper has extended Dung’s theory of argumentation to integrate metalevel argumentation about preferences. Dung’s
level of abstraction is preserved, so that arguments expressing preferences are distinguished by being the source of a
second attack relation that abstractly characterises application of preferences by attacking attacks between the arguments
that are the subject of the preference claims. Dung’s acceptability calculus has been extended to additionally account for
reinstatement of attacks, and extensional semantics are then (apart from the grounded semantics) deﬁned in exactly the
same way as for a Dung framework. The extended theory thus retains the basic conceptual machinery of Dung’s theory,
and some basic results that hold for a Dung framework are also shown to hold for the extended framework. We therefore
propose that applications and developments of Dung’s theory can be readily modiﬁed to accommodate argumentation about
preferences. In particular, proof theories [30] to determine the justiﬁed status of an argument A, take the form of games
played between the proponent and opponent of A. Each player responds to its counterpart’s move (argument) with an
argument that attacks its counterpart’s argument, and rules on the legality of moves vary according to the semantics under
which the justiﬁed status of A is to be established. Ongoing work is focusing on adapting these proof theories to EAFs, by
additionally allowing players to move arguments against the attacks that are implicitly moved by their counterparts.
Future work will also focus on development of dialogue frameworks in which participants can argue about preferences.
Dung’s inherently dialectical theory, and subsequent development of argument games, has informed development of dia-
logue frameworks in which participants’ locutions implicitly deﬁne arguments that can be organised into a Dung framework.
For example, Prakken deﬁnes a general framework for conﬂict resolution dialogues [33] that we believe can readily be gen-
eralised to accommodate preference arguments that can then be organised into an EAF. In a recent general framework for
negotiation dialogues [4], an agent can decide to accept or reject offers based on its own argumentation based model of
reasoning about offers. The model assumes a given preference ordering on arguments. However, a comprehensive account
of negotiation will also require that agents can justify and debate their preferences. Work on deliberation dialogues [21], in
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that each agent uses when proposing or rejecting a course of action.
Our work provides a formal setting for studying application of preferences, and more generally, removal of attacks. We
have shown that a less involved deﬁnition of acceptability suﬃces for preference symmetric EAFs, and that while in general
an EAF’s characteristic function is not monotonic, the characteristic functions of hierarchical and preference symmetric EAFs
do satisfy monotonicity. Our work on preference symmetric EAFs can also inform work on resolution based semantics [9,
26], whereby a framework’s resolutions obtained by substituting asymmetric for symmetric attacks; indeed, the choice of
resolution can now be explicitly modelled through integration of preference arguments.
The extended theory is proposed as a unifying formalism for works that augment Dung’s abstract theory with prefer-
ences, and as a framework for instantiation by non-monotonic logics whose object level languages allow for expression of
priorities over rules. In Section 5 we described how value based argumentation [11], extended to allow integration of meta-
level reasoning about values and value orderings, can be formalised in hierarchical EAFs. In Section 7, the inferences of an
ALP-DP theory [34] were shown to correspond with the claims of arguments in the grounded extension of an EAF instanti-
ated by the theory’s arguments and attacks. In contrast with [34], we also provided a well deﬁned notion of the admissible
and preferred extensions of an ALP-DP theory. It remains to formally show that extended argumentation semantics can be
given for other object level formalisms such as [14,17,24].
In Section 5 we described a practical reasoning example that assumed arguments constructed in an underlying BDI logic
as described in [8]. This work is one amongst a number of recent works (e.g., [24,25,35]) that propose argumentation based
approaches to agent reasoning over the whole gamut of mental attitudes, including beliefs, goals, intentions, etc. We sug-
gest that the framework described in this paper will facilitate development of agent reasoning formalisms that provide for
defeasible reasoning about preferences, and thus provide for agent ﬂexibility and adaptability (this proposal is explored in
more detail in [29,31] and also by Kakas and Moraitis [23,24]). For example, the BOID agent architecture characterises gen-
erated candidate goal sets as extensions of a prioritised default logic theory in which rules for inferring goals are modelled
as defaults, and a prioritisation of these defaults resolves conﬂicts between goals [22]. Agent behavioural types correspond
to different prioritisations. For example, a ‘social’ agent uniformly prioritises defaults for obligation derived goals above
defaults for desire derived goals. However, certain contexts may warrant selﬁsh behaviour (corresponding to the reverse
prioritisation). Such behavioural heterogeneity requires reasoning as to which prioritisation (agent type) is appropriate in a
given context. In [29], we suggest that extended argumentation frameworks will facilitate development of logical formalisms
for contextual reasoning of this type.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proofs of propositions in Section 3
Proposition 1. If A defeatsS B then ∀S ′ ⊆ S, A defeatsS ′ B.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Deﬁnition 5. 
Proposition 2. Let S be conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args,R,D). Then for any X, Y ∈ S, X does not defeatS Y .
Proof. Suppose X, Y ∈ S , X →S Y . In which case (X, Y ) ∈ R and ¬∃Z ∈ S s.t. (Z , (X, Y )) ∈ D, contradicting S is conﬂict
free. 
A.2. Proofs of propositions in Section 4
Lemma 1 is required for the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args,R,D), and let A be an argument that is acceptable w.r.t. S . Then:
1. A does not defeatS A.
2. ∀C ∈ S, C does not defeatS A.
922 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934Proof. (1) Suppose A →S A. By assumption of A acceptable w.r.t. S , ∃D ∈ S s.t. D →S A, ∃E ∈ S s.t. E →S D , contradicting
Proposition 2. (2) Suppose ∃C ∈ S s.t. C →S A. By assumption of A acceptable w.r.t. S , ∃D ∈ S s.t. D →S C , contradicting
Proposition 2. 
The following lemma and proof of Proposition 3 refer to an EAFs characteristic function deﬁned in Deﬁnition 10.
Lemma 2. Let S and S ′ be subsets of Args in (Args,R,D). If S ⊆ S ′ and no argument in S defeatsS an argument in S ′ − S. Then
F (S) ⊆ F (S ′).
Proof. Let A ∈ F (S). Suppose ∃B s.t. B →S ′ A. By Proposition 1, B →S A, and so ∃C , C →S B and there is a reinstatement
set RS for C →S B . We show that C →S ′ B and there is a reinstatement set RS ′ for C →S ′ B:
Suppose otherwise. In which case X S
′
Y for some X →S Y ∈ RS , i.e., X ⇀ Y and ∃B ′ ∈ S ′ − S s.t. B ′ (X ⇀ Y ). But
then by assumption of RS being a reinstatement set, ∃C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ →S B ′ , contradicting the assumption that no argument
in S defeatsS an argument in S ′ − S . 
Proposition 3. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an Extended Argumentation Framework, S an admissible extension of , and let A, A′ be
arguments which are acceptable w.r.t. S . Then:
1. S ′ = S ∪ {A} is admissible.
2. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ .
Proof. 1) By assumption of A acceptable w.r.t S and Lemma 1-2, no argument in S defeatsS an argument in S ′ − S (= {A}).
Hence, by Lemma 2, F (S) ⊆ F (S ′). Since S is admissible and A is acceptable w.r.t. S , then S ∪ {A} ⊆ F (S), and so S ′ ⊆ F (S ′),
i.e., S ′ is admissible.
2) Follows from F (S) ⊆ F (S ′) and assumption of A′ acceptable w.r.t. S . 
Proposition 4. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an Extended Argumentation Framework.
1. The set of all admissible extensions of  form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.
2. For each admissible extension E of  there exists a preferred extension E ′ of  such that E ⊆ E ′ .
Proof. Immediately from Proposition 3 and deﬁnition of preferred extensions (Deﬁnition 9). 
Corollary 1. Every EAF possesses at least one preferred extension.
Proof. From Proposition 4 and the fact that ∅ is an admissible extension of any EAF. 
Proposition 5. Every stable extension of an EAF is a preferred extension but not vice versa.
Proof. It is clear that each stable extension is a preferred extension. To show the reverse does not hold, one need only
consider an EAF containing a single argument that attacks itself. ∅ is the single preferred extension. There is no stable
extension. 
We establish some lemmas required for the proofs of the propositions that follow.
Lemma 3. Let  = (Args,R,D) be an EAF. If (X, Y ), (Y , X) ∈ R, then for any conﬂict free S ⊆ Args, either X →S Y or Y →S X .
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e., X S Y and Y S X . In which case ∃Z , Z ′ ∈ S s.t. Z  (X ⇀ Y ), Z ′ (Y ⇀ X), and so by
deﬁnition of an EAF, Z  Z ′ , contradicting S is conﬂict free. 
Lemma 4. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args,R,D), and A, B be arguments such that A defeatsS B. Then it cannot be that
both A and B are acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. Suppose B is acceptable w.r.t. S . Then ∃C ∈ S s.t. C →S A. Suppose A is acceptable w.r.t. S . Then ∃C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ →S C ,
contradicting Proposition 2. 
Lemma 5. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args in (Args,R,D). Suppose S ⊆ F (S). Then F (S) is conﬂict free.
Proof. Assume F (S) is not conﬂict free. Then ∃A, B ∈ F (S) such that either
S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934 9231. (A, B) ∈ R, (B, A) /∈ R, ¬∃C ∈ F (S) s.t. (C, (A, B)) ∈ D. Since S ⊆ F (S), then A →S B; or
2. (A, B) ∈ R, (B, A) ∈ R. By Lemma 3, either A →S B or B →S A.
In both cases ∃X, Y ∈ F (S) s.t. X defeatsS Y , contradicting Lemma 4. 
Proposition 6 is a special case of Lemma 6:
Lemma 6. Let F be the characteristic function of (Args,R,D), F 0+ any subset of the set {A | A is acceptable w.r.t. ∅}, and F i+1+ =
F (F i+). Then ∀i, F i+ ⊆ F i+1+ and F i+ is conﬂict free.
Proof. Base case: i = 0,1. If (B, A) ∈ R, then by Deﬁnition 5, it must be that B →∅ A and so A cannot be acceptable w.r.t. ∅.
Hence, F 0+ is some subset of {A | ∀B ∈ Args, (B, A) /∈ R}, i.e., some subset of the set of arguments that are not defeatedS for
any S ⊆ Args. Hence, F 0+ ⊆ F 1+ and F 0+ is conﬂict free.
By Lemma 5, F 1+ = F (F 0+) is conﬂict free. By Lemma 1-2 no argument in F 0+ defeatsF 0+ an argument in F 1+ . Hence, by
Lemma 2, F (F 0+) ⊆ F (F 1+), i.e., F 1+ ⊆ F 2+ .
Inductive hypothesis: For j < i, F j+ ⊆ F j+1+ and F j+ is conﬂict free.
General case: i. By inductive hypothesis, F i−1+ is conﬂict free and F i−1+ ⊆ F i+ , and so since F i+ = F (F i−1+ ), then by
Lemma 5 F i+ is conﬂict free. Since F i−1+ is conﬂict free and F i+ = F (F i−1+ ), then by Lemma 1-2 no argument in F i−1+
defeatsF i−1+
an argument in F i+ . Given F i−1+ ⊆ F i+ , then by Lemma 2, F (F i−1+ ) ⊆ F (F i+). That is, F i+ ⊆ F i+1+ . 
Proposition 6. Let F be the characteristic function of an EAF, and F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then ∀i, F i ⊆ F i+1 and F i is conﬂict free.
Proof. Follows as a special case of Lemma 6, where F 0+ = F 0 = ∅. 
A.3. Proofs of propositions in Section 5
Proposition 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF  = (Args,R,D). Let S and S ′ be conﬂict free
subsets of Args such that S ⊆ S ′ . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ′).
Proof. Assume A is acceptable w.r.t. S . We show that A is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ .
Suppose ∃B1 s.t. B1 →S ′ A. By Proposition 1, B1 →S A, and by assumption of A acceptable w.r.t. S , ∃C1 ∈ S s.t. C1 →S
B1 and there is a reinstatement set RS for C1→S B1.
Since S ⊆ S ′ , C1 ∈ S ′ , and so to show A is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ , it is suﬃcient to show there is a reinstatement set RS ′ for
C1→S ′ B1.
Since  is hierarchical, we can identify a sequenced partition of the reinstatement set RS for C1 →S B1. Let H =
(((Args1,R1),D1), . . . , ((Argsn,Rn),Dn)) be the partition of . Since  is bounded (Dn = ∅) one can represent RS by the
ﬁnite:
RSi =
{
C1→S B1}∪ RSi+1 ∪ · · · ∪ RSk ,
where:
1) for each defeat in RS j , j < k, any defence attack on the defeat originates from an argument that is itself defeated
in RS j+1 . That is, for j = i . . .k − 1: RS j = {C j1 →S B j1,C j2 →S B j2 . . .} such that for m = 1,2, . . . , (C jm, B jm) ∈ R j , and if
B (C jm ⇀ B jm) then B is some B j+1 ∈ Args j+1, and C j+1 →S B j+1 ∈ RS j+1
2) since  is bounded, RSk is a set of defeats {Ck1 →S Bk1,Ck2 →S Bk2, . . .} such that for m = 1,2, . . . , ¬∃B ∈ Args s.t.
B (Ckm ⇀ Bkm).
We show the existence of RS ′ by showing that if C →S B ∈ RS then C →S ′ B . Proof is by induction on the above
sequenced partition:
Base case: C →S B ∈ RSk . Suppose C S
′
B . Then ∃B ′ ∈ S ′ , B ′ (C ⇀ B), contradicting 2).
Inductive hypothesis: For l > j, C →S B ∈ RSl implies C →S
′
B .
General case: C →S B ∈ RS j . Suppose C S ′ B . Then ∃B ′ ∈ S ′ , B ′  (C ⇀ B). Since RS is a reinstatement set, ∃C ′ ∈ S ,
C ′ ∈ Args j+1, C ′ →S B ′ ∈ RS j+1 . By inductive hypothesis, C ′ →S ′ B ′ . But then since C ′, B ′ ∈ S ′ and S ′ is conﬂict free by
assumption, this contradicts Proposition 2. 
Lemma 7 states that the characteristic function of a ﬁnitary EAF is ω-continuous. This is required for the proof of
Proposition 8.
924 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934Lemma 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a ﬁnitary EAF  = (Args,R,D). Then F is ω-continuous.
Proof. Let S0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Sn ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of sets of arguments, and let S = S0 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn ∪ · · ·. Let A ∈ F (S).
Since there are ﬁnitely many arguments B that attack and so defeatS A, and for any such B →S A, there are ﬁnitely many
arguments C s.t. (C, (B, A)) ∈ D, then there exists a number m s.t. A ∈ F (Sm). Therefore, F (S) = F (S0)∪· · ·∪ F (Sn)∪· · · . 
Proposition 8. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a bounded hierarchical EAF. Then:
1.
⋃∞
i=0(F i) ⊆ GE().
2. If  is ﬁnitary, then
⋃∞
i=0(F i) = GE().
Proof.
1. Immediately from the monotonicity of F for bounded hierarchical EAFs (Proposition 7).
2. From Lemma 7. 
Proposition 9. Let Γ = 〈Args,R, V ,val,a〉 be an aVAF and  its equivalent EAF. Let s ∈ {preferred, grounded, complete}. Then ∀A ∈
Args, A is a sceptically, respectively credulously, justiﬁed argument of Γ under the s semantics, iff A is a sceptically, respectively
credulously, justiﬁed argument of  under the s semantics.
Proof. Let (Args,Ra) be obtained on the basis of Γ as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 17. Let  = (Args,R,D). Then ∀Z , Y ∈ Args
s.t. val(Z) = v , val(Y ) = v ′: (Z , Y ) ∈ Ra iff
• Args contains the arguments Z , Y ,val(Z) > val(Y ),val(Y ) > val(Z) and a.
• R contains the attacks (Z , Y ), (val(Z) > val(Y ),val(Y ) > val(Z)), and (val(Y ) > val(Z),val(Z) > val(Y )).
• D contains the defence attacks (val(Y ) > val(Z), (Z , Y )) and (a, (val(Y ) > val(Z),val(Z) > val(Y ))).
By deﬁnition (for both Dung and extended frameworks), a complete extension is a ﬁxed point of a framework’s characteristic
function, and the grounded and preferred extensions are, respectively, the least and maximal (under set inclusion) complete
extensions. Hence, let FΓ and F be the characteristic functions of (Args,Ra) and  respectively. The proposition is proved
by showing: S is a ﬁxed point of FΓ iff S ′ is a ﬁxed point of F , where S ⊆ S ′ and (S ′ − S) ∩ Args = ∅, which holds iff:
∀Z ∈ Args, Z is acceptable w.r.t. S iff Z is acceptable w.r.t. S ′. (i)
Prior to proving (i), note that since a ∈ Args is not attacked by any argument, then:
every ﬁxed point of F contains a, and
{
v > v ′
∣∣ (a, (v ′ > v, v > v ′)
) ∈ D} (= {v > v ′ | v >a v ′}
)
. (ii)
(i) is shown by showing 1) and 2) below:
1. ∀Y , X ∈ Args, (Y , X ) ∈ Ra iff Y →S ′ X .
This follows from (Y , X ) ∈ Ra iff val(X)≯a val(Y ) iff val(Y ) >a val(X) iff (by (ii)) val(Y ) > val(X) ∈ S ′ and so val(X) >
val(Y ) /∈ S ′ (since S ′ is conﬂict free) and so Y →S ′ X .
2. ∀Z ∈ S ′ , ∀Y /∈ S ′ , if Z →S ′ Y then there is a reinstatement set RS ′ for Z →S ′ Y .
There are two cases to consider:
a) Suppose Z , Y ∈ Args. Given 1), val(Z) > val(Y ) ∈ S ′ . We have (val(Y ) > val(Z))  (Z ⇀ Y ). But then val(Z) >
val(Y ) →S ′ val(Y ) > val(Z), and ¬∃a′ ∈ Args s.t. a′  (val(Z) > val(Y ) ⇀ val(Y ) > val(Z)). Hence RS ′ = {Z →S ′
Y ,val(Z) > val(Y ) →S ′ val(Y ) > val(Z)}.
b) Suppose either Z /∈ Args or Y /∈ Args. Then Z is of the form v > v ′ and Y is of the form v ′ > v , and by (ii), v >a v ′
and since ¬∃a′ = a, {v > v ′ →S ′ v ′ > v} is a reinstatement set for v > v ′ →S ′ v ′ > v . 
A.4. Proofs of propositions in Section 6
Lemma 8 is used in the proof of Proposition 10.
Lemma 8. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a preference symmetric EAF, and X, Y ∈ Args such that (X, Y ) ∈ R. Then ∀S ⊆ Args:
1. If S is conﬂict free, either X →S Y or Y →S X .
2. If X →S Y , and for some conﬂict free superset S ′ of S, XS ′ Y , then Y →S X .
3. If X strictly defeatsS Y , then X strictly defeatsS ′ Y for all conﬂict free supersets S ′ of S.
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Proof.
1. Assume that for some S , XS Y . Hence there is a Z ∈ S s.t. Z  (X ⇀ Y ). Since  is preference symmetric, (Y , X) ∈ R.
By Lemma 3, Y →S X .
2. Since S ′ is conﬂict free and XS ′ Y , then given (1), Y →S ′ X , and so by Proposition 1, Y →S X .
3. Assume that for some S ′ , X S ′ Y . Then given (2), Y →S X , contradicting X strictly defeatsS Y . Assume Y →S ′ X . By
Proposition 1, Y →S X , contradicting X strictly defeatsS Y . 
Proposition 10. Let (Args,R,D) be a preference symmetric EAF. Let S be a conﬂict free subset of Args. Then, every argument in S is
ps acceptable w.r.t. S iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. Right to left half : Let A ∈ S . If ∃B s.t. B →S A, then ∃C ∈ S s.t. C →S B and there is a reinstatement set RS for C →S B ,
i.e., ∀Y such that Y  (C ⇀ B), there exists a X →S Y ∈ RS such that X ∈ S . Hence, by Deﬁnition 20, A is ps acceptable
w.r.t. S .
Left to right half : Let A ∈ S . If ∃B1 s.t. B1→S A, then ∃C1 ∈ S s.t. C1→S B1, and C1→S B1 is reinstated. We show there
must be a reinstatement set RS for C1 →S B1 (and so A is acceptable w.r.t. S). Suppose otherwise. Then, there exists at
least one set of sequences of the form:
{
(
Bn+11  (Cn1 ⇀ Bn), Cn1 →S Bn . . . B2 (C1⇀ B1), C1→S B1
)
.
.
.(
Bn+1m  (Cnm ⇀ Bn), Cnm →S Bn . . . B2 (C1⇀ B1), C1→S B1
)
}
(1)
such that:
– for some n 2, {Cn1 . . . Cnm } is the set of all arguments in S that defeatS Bn (2)
– for j = 1 . . .m, ¬∃Cn+1 j ∈ S s.t. Cn+1 j →S Bn+1 j . (3)
Intuitively, given a preference argument Bn attacking an attack that originates from an argument in S , then for the set
{Cn1 →S Bn . . . Cnm →S Bn} of all potential reinstating defeats, each such defeat must itself be challenged and not defeat
reinstated (this is visualised in Fig. 9). Note that it must be that n  2 since C1 →S B1 is reinstated, and so there must
at least be a set {C21 . . .C2m }. Note also that since for j = 1 . . .m, Cn j →S Bn is challenged by a preference argument, then
since  is preference symmetric, we have that for j = 1 . . .m, (Bn,Cn j ) ∈ R.
Proof is by contradiction. Suppose no reinstatement set RS for C1 →S B1, and so there exists a set of sequences as
described in (1)–(3). There are two cases to consider:
i) Suppose that for some j = 1 . . .m, Bn S Cn j . Hence, ∃B ′ ∈ S s.t. B ′  (Bn ⇀ Cn j ). By (1) and (2), ∃Bn+1 j , Bn+1 j 
(Cn j ⇀ Bn) and Cn j →S Bn , and so it must be the case that Bn+1 j /∈ S .
Hence, ∃B ′ ∈ S , Bn+1 j /∈ S , and since they express contradictory preferences, B ′  Bn+1 j . Since S is conﬂict free, then
by Lemma 8-1, either Bn+1 j →S B ′ or B ′ →S Bn+1 j . If B ′ →S Bn+1 j , then this contradicts (3). If Bn+1 j →S B ′ , then since
B ′ ∈ S and by assumption every argument in S is ps acceptable w.r.t. S , then there must exist a C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ →S Bn+1 j ,
contradicting (3).
ii) Suppose that for j = 1 . . .m, Bn →S Cn j . Since by (2), {Cn1 . . . Cnm } is the set of all arguments in S that defeatS Bn , and
by assumption each Cn j is ps acceptable w.r.t. S , then it must be the case that at least one Cn j →S Bn is reinstated (otherwise
no Cn j would be ps acceptable). That is, for some Bn+1 j there exists a C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ →S Bn+1 j , contradicting (3). 
Corollary 2. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a ps-EAF. Let S be an admissible extension of . If A ∈ Args is ps acceptable w.r.t. S then A is
acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. The proof proceeds in the same way as for the left to right half of Proposition 10, except that A ∈ Args (rather than
restricting to A ∈ S) and in i) and ii) the assumption of arguments in S being ps acceptable w.r.t. S is replaced by the
assumption of arguments in S being acceptable w.r.t. S . 
926 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934Proposition 11. Let F be the characteristic function of a preference symmetric EAF(Args,R,D). Let S and S ′ be conﬂict free subsets
of Args such that S ⊆ S ′ . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ′).
Proof. Given Lemma 2 it suﬃces to show that no A ∈ S defeatsS some B ∈ S ′ − S . Suppose otherwise. Hence (A, B) ∈ R.
Since S ′ is conﬂict free, (C, (A, B)) ∈ D and (B, A) /∈ R, contradicting  being a ps-EAF. 
Proposition 12. Let  = (Args,R,D) be a preference symmetric EAF, F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Then:
1.
⋃∞
i=0(F i) ⊆ GE().
2. If  is ﬁnitary, then
⋃∞
i=0(F i) = GE(). 
Proof.
1. Immediately from the monotonicity of F for preference symmetric EAFs (Proposition 11).
2. From Lemma 7. 
Lemmas 9 and 10 are used in the proof of Proposition 13.
Lemma 9. Let S be an admissible extension of a ps-EAF. If A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S then A is acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. Given Corollary 2, it suﬃces to show that if A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S then A is ps acceptable w.r.t. S . Suppose
∃B s.t. B defeatsS A, and so ∃C ∈ S s.t. C strictly defeatsS B . We need to show that C →S B is reinstated:
Suppose ∃B1 s.t. (B1, (C, B)) ∈ D. Since  is a ps-EAF, then B ⇀ C . By assumption of C strictly defeatingS B , B S C ,
and so ∃D1 ∈ S s.t. (D1, (B,C)) ∈ D. Hence, D1 B1. S is conﬂict free and so (by Lemma 3) B1 →S D1 or D1 →S B1. If
D1 →S B1 then C →S B is reinstated. If D1S B1, B1 →S D1, then since by assumption of S being admissible, D1 ∈ S is
acceptable w.r.t. S , and so ∃C1 ∈ S s.t. C1 →S B1. Hence C →S B is reinstated. 
Lemma 10. Let  be a ps-EAF (Args,R,D) and F i be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 11. Then ∀Y ∈ Args, if Y is acceptable w.r.t. F i then Y is
strict-acceptable w.r.t. F i .
Proof. Base case. By Proposition 6, ∀i, F i ⊆ F i+1. Hence:
BC1 F 1 = {A1, . . . , An} is the set of arguments acceptable w.r.t. ∅. Hence:
for i = 1 . . .n: ∀X ∈ Args, (X, Ai) /∈ R, and so Ai is strict acceptable w.r.t.
any S ⊆ Args
and since  is a ps-EAF, ¬∃Y s.t. (Y , (Ai, X)
) ∈ D, and so:
(i)
for i = 1 . . .n: ∀X ∈ Args s.t. (Ai, X) ∈ R, ∀S ⊆ Args, Ai strictly defeatsS X . (ii)
BC2 F 2 = {B1, . . . , Bm, A1, . . . , An} is the set of arguments acceptable w.r.t. F 1
BC2.1 By (i), each Ai is strict acceptable w.r.t. F 1.
BC2.2 Suppose for some i = 1 . . .m, ∃X s.t. X →F 1 Bi . By assumption of Bi acceptable w.r.t. F 1, ∃A j ∈ F 1 s.t. A j →F 1 X .
By (ii), A j strictly →F 1 X .
BC3 F 3 = {C1, . . . ,Ck, B1, . . . , Bm, A1, . . . , An} is the set of arguments acceptable w.r.t. F 2.
BC3.1 By (i), each Ai is strict acceptable w.r.t. F 2.
BC3.2 Suppose for some i = 1 . . .m, ∃X s.t. X →F 2 Bi . By Proposition 1, X →F 1 Bi . By assumption of Bi acceptable
w.r.t. F 1, ∃A j ∈ F 1 s.t. A j →F 1 X . By (ii), A j strictly →F 2 X .
BC3.3 Suppose for some i = 1 . . .k, ∃X s.t. X →F 2 Ck . By assumption of Ck acceptable w.r.t. F 2, ∃Z ∈ F 2 s.t. Z →F 2 X .
Suppose Z ∈ {A1, . . . , An}. Then by (ii), Z strictly →F 2 X . Suppose Z ∈ {B1, . . . , Bm}, and Z does not strictly
→F 2 X . Then X →F 2 Z . But then BC3.2 shows that for some j = 1 . . .n, A j strictly →F 2 X .
Inductive hypothesis: For j < i, if Y is acceptable w.r.t. F j then Y is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F j .
General case: Let Y be any argument acceptable w.r.t. F i . Suppose X →F i Y . Hence, ∃Z ∈ F i s.t. Z →F i X . Suppose Z
does not strictly →F i X . Then X →F i Z . By Proposition 6, F i−1 ⊆ F i , and so by Proposition 1, X →F i−1 Z . Since Z ∈ F i ,
then by inductive hypothesis Z is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F i−1; that is, there exists a Z ′ ∈ F i−1 s.t. Z ′ strictly →F i−1 X . By
Proposition 6, F i−1 ⊆ F i , and so Z ′ ∈ F i , and by Lemma 8-3, Z ′ strictly →F i X . 
S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934 927Proposition 13. Let  be a preference symmetric EAF, and let F i be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 11, F∗i deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 23. Then
F∗i = F i .
Proof. Base case: F∗0 = F 0 = ∅. F∗1 = F 1 = {A | ∀B ∈ Args, (B, A) /∈ R}.
Suppose A is acceptable w.r.t. F 1. By Lemma 10, A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F 1, and so F∗1. Suppose A is strict-acceptable
w.r.t. F∗1. Since F∗1 = F 1,and F 1 is admissible, then by Lemma 9, A is acceptable w.r.t. F 1.
Inductive hypothesis: For j < i, F∗ j = F j , and F j is admissible.
General case: Suppose A is acceptable w.r.t. F i−1. By Lemma 10, A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F i−1 (= F∗i−1 by inductive
hypothesis). Suppose A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F∗i−1. By inductive hypothesis, F∗i−1 = F i−1, and F i−1 is admissible. By
Lemma 9, A is acceptable w.r.t. F i−1. 
Corollaries 3 and 4 are used in proofs in Section 7. Corollary 3 restates Proposition 13 showing equivalence of the
iterations obtained by F and Fst respectively starting with F 0+ (containing some subset of arguments acceptable w.r.t. ∅)
and F∗0+ (containing some subset of arguments strict acceptable w.r.t. ∅).
Corollary 3. Let  be a preference symmetric EAF, and let F i+ be deﬁned as in Lemma 6. Let F∗0+ be some subset of {A |
A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. ∅}, F∗i+1+ = Fst(F∗i+). Then F∗i+ = F i+ .
Proof. Proof follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, where:
• ‘F i+ ’ substitutes for ‘F i ’ in the statement of Lemma 10.
• In the proof of Lemma 10: i) Lemma 6 substitutes for Proposition 6; ii) in proof of the base case, F 0+ , F 1+ and F 2+
respectively substitute for F 1, F 2 and F 3; iii) in BC1, “{A1, . . . , An} is some subset of the arguments {A1, . . . , An}
acceptable w.r.t. ∅” replaces “{A1, . . . , An} is the set of arguments acceptable w.r.t. ∅”.
• F i+ substitutes for F i in the inductive hypothesis and general case. 
Corollary 4. Let  be a preference symmetric EAF, F∗0+ be some subset of {A | A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. ∅}, F∗i+1+ = Fst(F∗i+). Then
∀i, F∗i+ ⊆ F∗i+1+ and F∗i+ is conﬂict free.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 6 and Corollary 3. 
A.5. Proofs of propositions in Section 7
Lemma 11 proves results stated in Remark 1.
Lemma 11. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for (S, D), and let A, B ∈ Args. Then:
1.  is preference symmetric.
2. If A undercuts B, then A defeatsS B for any S ⊆ Args.
3. If ([ ], (X, Y )) ∈ D then there does not exist a (Z , (Y , X)) ∈ D.
4. ([ ], B) ∈ R iff B is incoherent.
5. There is no B such that (B, [ ]) ∈ R.
6. If A does not undercut B, A conclusion–conclusion attacks B and B undercuts A, then A does not defeatS B for any S ⊆ Args such
that S contains [ ].
7. If A ∈ Args is incoherent, then A is not acceptable w.r.t. any S ⊆ Args.
Proof.
1. If (C, (A, B)) ∈ D as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 32-3(a) then (A, B) ∈ R2, i.e., A and B conclusion–conclusion attack, and so
(B, A) ∈ R2. If (C, (A, B)) ∈ D as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 32-3(b) then (A, B) ∈ R2, (B, A) ∈ R1. Hence, if (C, (A, B)) ∈ D,
then (A, B), (B, A) ∈ R, i.e.,  is preference symmetric.
2. If A undercuts B , then by Deﬁnition 32-3, there does not exist a (C, (A, B)) ∈ D. Hence A S-defeats B for any S ⊂ Args.
3. Suppose ([ ], (X, Y )) ∈ D. Since [ ] cannot conclude an ordering, then by Deﬁnition 32-3(b), it must be that Y under-
cuts X . Hence (Y , X ) ∈ R1, and so by Deﬁnition 32-3, ¬∃Z s.t. (Z , (Y , X)) ∈ D.
4. By Deﬁnition 32-2(c), B is incoherent implies ([ ], B) ∈ R3. By Deﬁnition 27, [ ] does not conclusion–conclusion or
undercut attack any argument, and so ([ ], B) cannot be in R1∪R2. By deﬁnition of an EAF, if (Z , (X, Y )), (Z ′, (Y , X)) ∈
D, then (Z , Z ′), (Z ′, Z) ∈ R. Hence, suppose Z = [ ] and ([ ], (X, Y )) ∈ D. By 3 there does not exist a (Z ′, (Y , X)) ∈ D.
Hence, ([ ], B) ∈ R iff B is incoherent.
928 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–9345. By Deﬁnition 27, no argument can conclusion–conclusion or undercut [ ]. By 4, B cannot be [ ]. By 3 it cannot be that
(B, [ ]) ∈ R on account of (B, (X, Y )), ([ ], (Y , X)) ∈ D. Hence, there is no B such that (B, [ ]) ∈ R.
6. It cannot be that A = B (i.e., A is incoherent) since this would imply (by assumption of B undercutting A) that A
undercuts B . Hence, (A, B) ∈ R′ in Deﬁnition 32-3, and since B undercuts A, ([ ], (A, B)) ∈ D. Hence, for any S s.t.
[ ] ∈ S , A does not defeatS B .
7. By Deﬁnition 32-2(c), if A is incoherent then ([ ], A) ∈ R. By Deﬁnition 32-3, no argument can d-attack ([ ], A), and
so [ ] defeatsS A for any S . By 5, no argument can attack and so defeatS [ ]. Hence, A cannot be acceptable w.r.t.
any S . 
Proposition 14. Let (Args,R,D) be the EAF for a theory (S, D). If (C, (A, B)), (C ′, (B, A)) ∈ D then C and C ′ conclusion–conclusion
attack.
Proof. By Lemma 11-3, C = [ ], C ′ = [ ]. By Deﬁnition 32-3, A does not undercut B , B does not undercut A, and
(A, B), (B, A) ∈ R where A and B conclusion–conclusion attack. Without loss of generality, we can assume that they attack
on a single pair of conclusions, such that RB and RA are the relevant sets of defeasible rules for B and A. By assumption of
(C, (A, B)) ∈ D, ∃r ∈ RA s.t. ∀r′ ∈ RB , C concludes r ≺ r′ (denoted by r ≺C r′). By assumption of (C ′, (B, A)) ∈ D, ∃r′ ∈ RB s.t.
∀r ∈ RA , r′ ≺C ′ r. But then the latter can only be the case if for some r ∈ RA , r′ ∈ RB , r ≺C r′ and r′ ≺C ′ r. That is, C and C ′
conclusion–conclusion attack. 
Lemmas 12 and 13 are required for the proof of the following Proposition 15.
Lemma 12. Let A′ be a sub-argument of A, X an argument such that X conclusion–conclusion attacks both A and A′ , and A does not
undercut X. Let B be an argument s.t. (B, (X, A)) ∈ D. Then (B, (X, A′)) ∈ D.
Proof. It cannot be the case that B = [ ], since B cannot conclude an ordering, and by Deﬁnition 32-3(b), ([ ], (X, A)) ∈ D
only when A undercuts X . Since A does not undercut X then no sub-argument A′ of A undercuts X . It cannot be that X
undercuts A, and so any sub-argument A′ of A, since by Deﬁnition 32-3 we can not then have that (B, (X, A)) ∈ D. Hence,
let Ω = {(LA1 , LX1), . . . , (LAn , LXn )} be the set of pairs of conclusions on which A and X attack, (RA1 , RX1 ), . . . , (RAn , RXn )
the respective sets of relevant rules, where for j = 1 . . .n, RA j > RX j , based on the ordering concluded by B . Since A′ is a
sub-argument of A, Ω ′ ⊆ Ω is the set of pairs of conclusions on which A′ and X attack. Hence (B, (X, A′)) ∈ D. 
Lemma 13. Let = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for (S, D), and let E be a conﬂict free subset of Args. If A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. E then
all sub-arguments A′ of A are acceptable w.r.t E.
Proof. Suppose for some sub-argument A′ of A, X →E A′ . By Lemma 11-7, A and so A′ cannot be incoherent, and since
([ ], A′) ∈ R iff A′ is incoherent (by Lemma 11-4), then X = [ ]. We show that there is a Z s.t. Z →E X and a reinstatement
set for Z →E X :
If X →E A then by assumption of A acceptable w.r.t. E , there is a Y ∈ E , Y →E X and there is a reinstatement set for
Y →E X . Suppose X E A. Hence (by Lemma 11-2) X does not undercut A′ or A, X conclusion–conclusion attacks A′ and
A, and ∃B ∈ E s.t. (B, (X, A)) ∈ D. If A does not undercut X , then by Lemma 12, (B, (X, A′)) ∈ D, contradicting X →E A′ . If
A undercuts X , then A →E X (by Lemma 11-2), and by Deﬁnition 32-3 there does not exist a (C, (A, X)) ∈ D, and so we
have the reinstatement set {A →E X}. 
Proposition 15. Let  be the EAF for the ALP-DP theory (S, D). Then for s ∈ {grounded, complete, stable, preferred}, if A is sceptically,
respectively credulously, justiﬁed under the s semantics, then all sub-arguments of A are sceptically, respectively credulously, justiﬁed
under the s semantics.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 13. 
Proposition 16. If (S, D) is priority-ﬁnitary then its EAF  = (Args,R,D) is ﬁnitary.
Proof. Since (S, D) is priority-ﬁnitary, any Y ∈ Args is conclusion–conclusion or undercut attacked by a ﬁnite number of
arguments, and so {X | (X, Y ) ∈ R} is ﬁnite. Since, there is a ﬁnite number of rules deriving priorities, then the set of
composite priority arguments is ﬁnite, and so {Z | (Z , (X, Y )) ∈ D} is ﬁnite. Hence, by Deﬁnition 12,  is ﬁnitary. 
Proof of Proposition 17 below makes use of the following lemmas and notation. In what follows we will refer to [34]’s
deﬁnition of arguments, attack, defeat, acceptability and an ALP-DP theory’s characteristic function, as they are deﬁned here
in Deﬁnition 31.
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{A1, . . . , An} ⊆ S , where for i = 1 . . .n, Ai is a singleton priority argument.
Lemma 14. Given an ALP-DP theory (S, D), let Args and ArgsPS97
7 be the sets of arguments obtained by Deﬁnitions 25 and 31-1 respec-
tively. Then Args is closed under priority arguments, and Args and ArgsPS97 are equivalent modulo composite priority arguments
(as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 34).
Proof. Obvious, from Deﬁnitions 25 and 31-1. 
Notation 4. In what follows we assume that:
• SPS97, TPS97 . . . denote subsets of ArgsPS97, where ArgsPS97 denotes the arguments as deﬁned by an ALP-DP theory in [34]
(Deﬁnition 31-1 in this paper).
• Uppercase letters S, T . . . denote subsets of Args, where Args is the arguments deﬁned by an ALP-DP theory for instan-
tiation of an EAF (i.e., ArgsPS97 plus composite priority arguments as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 25). Henceforth, we assume
that for X = Args, S, T . . . : X is closed under priority arguments, and X and XPS97 are equivalent modulo composite
priority arguments.
Proposition 17 states that the grounded extension of an EAF  instantiated by an ALP-DP theory (S, D) (as deﬁned in
this paper) and the grounded extension of (S, D) as deﬁned in [34], are equivalent modulo composite priority arguments
(emcpa). We give an outline of the proof of the proposition:
1. Lemmas 15 and 17 are used in the proof of Lemma 18 which states that A ∈ ArgsPS97 is acceptable w.r.t. an admissi-
ble XPS97 as deﬁned in [34] iff A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. an admissible X as deﬁned in this paper.
2. Corollary 5, following on from Lemma 19, states that the grounded extension of  is obtained by iterating the charac-
teristic function Fst deﬁned by strict acceptability, where the iteration starts with {[ ]}.
3. Lemma 21 shows that the grounded extension of (S, D), as deﬁned in [34], is obtained by iterating the characteristic
function G deﬁned in [34], where the iteration starts with {[ ]}.
4. Given Corollary 5 and Lemma 21, Proposition 17 is proved by showing that starting with {[ ]}, the iterations of Fst and
G yield sets that are emcpa. The proof is by induction on the iteration, whereby the base case is shown, and then the
general case is shown by use of Lemma 18.
Lemma 15. Let (Args,R,D) be the EAF for an ALP-DP theory, S ⊆ Args such that S is closed under priority arguments, and [ ] ∈ S.
Let A, B ∈ Args such that A defeatsS B, and A is a composite argument. Then, there exists a sub-argument A′ of A such that A′ is a
singleton priority argument, and A′ defeatsS B.
Proof. Let A = A1 + · · · + An where for i = 1 . . .n, Ai is a singleton priority argument. If A defeatsS B , then either:
• A undercuts B , in which case for some i, Ai undercuts B . By Lemma 11-2, Ai defeatsS B .
• A does not undercut B , A conclusion–conclusion attacks B , and B does not undercut A (since if B did undercut A,
then by Lemma 11-6, A would not defeatS B), and ¬∃C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B)) ∈ D, i.e.:
¬∃C ∈ S s.t. C concludes ≺, and B is preferred≺ to A. (i)
Let {Ak . . . Am} be the singleton priority sub-arguments in A, such that for j = k . . .m, A j conclusion–conclusion attacks B .
Without loss of generality we assume each such attack on a single pair (L j, L j). Suppose that for j = k . . .m, A j does not
defeatS B:
Since B does not undercut A, then for j = k . . .m, B does not undercut A j . Hence, for j = k . . .m, ∃C j ∈ S such that
C j concludes ≺ j and (by Deﬁnition 30), B is preferred≺ j to A j , where the relevant rule set for L j is strictly greater than
(>) the relevant rule set for L j , and > is deﬁned on the basis of ≺ j (as in Deﬁnition 29). Since S is closed under priority
arguments, Ck + · · · + Cm is a composite priority argument in S that concludes ≺=⋃mj=k ≺ j , and so (by Deﬁnition 30) B is
preferred≺ to A, contradicting (i). 
For Lemma 16, recall the deﬁnition of a priority argument C concluding an ordering ≺ (Deﬁnition 25-2), and [34]’s
deﬁnition of an ordering ≺TPS97 concluded by singleton priority arguments in a set TPS97 ⊆ ArgsPS97 (Deﬁnition 31-3).
Lemma 16. Let S ⊆ Args, SPS97 ⊆ ArgsPS97 . Then, C ∈ S concludes ≺ iff there exists a TPS97 ⊆ SPS97 such that ≺TPS97 =≺.
7 PS97 refers to Prakken and Sartor’s paper [34] published in 1997.
930 S. Modgil / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 901–934Proof. Left to right half : Suppose C ∈ S concludes ≺, where C = C1 + · · · + Cn . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, then there is a
TPS97 = {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ SPS97, where ≺TPS97 =≺. Right to left half : Suppose TPS97 ⊆ SPS97, and let {C1, . . . ,Cn} be the singleton
priority arguments in TPS97 concluding ≺TPS97 . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ S . Since S is closed under priority
arguments, C = C1 + · · · + Cn ∈ S , where C concludes ≺=≺TPS97 . 
For Lemmas 17 and 18 recall [34]’s deﬁnition of defeat parameterised w.r.t. a set SPS97 of arguments (Deﬁnition 31-4).
Lemma 17. Let (Args,R,D) be the EAF for (S, D). Let S ⊆ Args, SPS97 ⊆ ArgsPS97 , such that [ ] ∈ S, [ ] ∈ SPS97 . ∀A, B ∈ ArgsPS97 , A
SPS97-defeats B iff A defeatsS B.
Proof.
• Suppose B = [ ]:
By Deﬁnition 31-2 and 31-4, B is not SPS97-defeated by any argument.
Given Lemma 11-5, B cannot be defeatedS by any argument.
• Suppose A = [ ]:
By Deﬁnitions 31-2 and 31-4, [ ] SPS97-defeats B iff B is incoherent.
By Lemma 11-4, ([ ], B) ∈ R iff B is incoherent. By Deﬁnition 32-3, there does not exist a (C, ([ ], B)) ∈ D. Hence, [ ]
defeatsS B iff B is incoherent.
• Suppose A = [ ], B = [ ]:
– If A undercuts B , then A SPS97-defeats B (Deﬁnition 31-4(b)), and A defeatsS B (Lemma 11-2).
– If A does not undercut B , A conclusion–conclusion attacks B and B does not undercut A, then:
A SPS97-defeats B iff B is not preferred≺SPS97 to A (Deﬁnition 31-4(a)).
A defeatsS B iff there is no C ∈ S such that C concludes ≺ and B is preferred≺ to A (Deﬁnition 32-3(a)).
Since preferred≺SPS97 and preferred≺ are deﬁned in the same way, then given Lemma 16, B is not preferred≺SPS97 to A
iff there is no C ∈ S such that C concludes ≺ and B is preferred≺ to A. Hence, A SPS97-defeats B iff A defeatsS B .
– If A does not undercut B , A conclusion–conclusion attacks B and B undercuts A, then A does not SPS97-defeats B
(Deﬁnition 31-4(a)), and A does not defeatS B (Lemma 11-6). 
Lemma 18. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for (S, D). Let S ⊆ Args, SPS97 ⊆ ArgsPS97 , such that [ ] ∈ S, [ ] ∈ SPS97 , S is conﬂict
free and SPS97 is conﬂict free. Suppose that every argument in SPS97 is ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. SPS97 , and every argument in S is
strict-acceptable w.r.t. S . Then, ∀A ∈ ArgsPS97:
A is ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. SPS97 iff A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. A is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t SPS97 iff ∀B ∈ ArgsPS97 s.t. B SPS97-defeats A, ∃C ∈ SPS97 s.t. C strictly SPS97-defeats B .
A is strict-acceptable w.r.t S iff ∀B ∈ Args s.t. B defeatsS A, ∃C ∈ S s.t. C strictly defeatsS B .
Right to Left half : Assume A ∈ ArgsPS97 is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S . Suppose a B ∈ ArgsPS97 s.t. B SPS97-defeats A. Since
Args and ArgsPS97 are equivalent modulo composite priority arguments (emcpa), B ∈ Args. By Lemma 17, B defeatsS A. By
assumption of A being strict-acceptable w.r.t. S , ∃C ∈ S s.t. C strictly defeatsS B . There are two cases to consider:
1. C ∈ ArgsPS97, B ∈ ArgsPS97, and so by Lemma 17, C strictly SPS97-defeats B . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, C ∈ SPS97. Hence,
A is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t SPS97.
2. C /∈ ArgsPS97. Hence, C is the composite priority argument C1 + · · · + Cn . By Lemma 15, there is a set {Ck, . . . ,Cm} of
singleton priority arguments that defeatS B . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, {Ck, . . . ,Cm} ⊆ SPS97. B ∈ ArgsPS97, and so
by Lemma 17, for i = k . . .m, Ci SPS97-defeats B . Suppose for some i = k . . .m, Ci strictly SPS97-defeats B . Then A is
ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t SPS97. Suppose for i = k . . .m, Ci does not strictly SPS97-defeat B , i.e., B SPS97-defeats Ci . But
then by assumption of each Ci being ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t. SPS97, there must be an argument in SPS97 that strictly
SPS97-defeats B . Hence, A is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t SPS97.
Left to Right half : Assume A ∈ ArgsPS97 is ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. SPS97. Suppose some B ∈ Args s.t. B defeatsS A. We
show that there is an argument in S that strictly defeatsS B . There are two cases to consider:
1. B ∈ ArgsPS97. By Lemma 17, B SPS97-defeats A. By assumption of A being ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. SPS97, ∃C ∈ SPS97 s.t. C
strictly SPS97-defeats B . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, C ∈ S . Since C, B ∈ ArgsPS97, then by Lemma 17, C strictly defeatsS
B . Hence, A is strict-acceptable w.r.t S .
2. B /∈ ArgsPS97. Hence, B is the composite priority argument B1 + · · · + Bn . By Lemma 15 there is a singleton Bi s.t. Bi
defeatsS A. Since Args and ArgsPS97 are emcpa, Bi ∈ ArgsPS97. Hence, by Lemma 17, Bi SPS97-defeats A, and since A
is ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. S , ∃C ∈ SPS97 s.t. C strictly SPS97-defeats Bi . Since S and SPS97 are emcpa, C ∈ S , and by
Lemma 17, C strictly defeatsS Bi . To show A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. S , we show that there must be an argument in S
that strictly defeatsS B = B1 + · · · + Bn:
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there is a C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ strictly defeatsS B .
– Suppose B does not undercut C (and so Bi does not undercut C ), and:
• C undercuts Bi , and so C undercuts B . By Lemma 11-2, C defeatsS B . If C and B do not conclusion–conclusion attack
then C strictly defeatsS B . Suppose C and B conclusion–conclusion attack. Since C undercuts B , then by Lemma 11-6,
B cannot defeatS C , and so C strictly defeatsS B .
• C does not undercut Bi , C conclusion–conclusion attacks Bi , and so C conclusion–conclusion attacks B . Hence,
(C, B), (B,C) ∈ R, S is conﬂict free, and so by Lemma 3, either C →S B or B →S C .
Suppose BS C . Then C strictly defeatsS B .
Suppose B →S C . Then by assumption of C being strict acceptable w.r.t. S , there exists a C ′ ∈ S s.t. C ′ strictly defeatsS
B . 
Lemma 19. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory, and GE() the grounded extension of . Let F be
the characteristic function of  as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 10. Let F 0+ = {[ ]}, F i+1+ = F (F i+). Then GE() =
⋃∞
i=0(F i+).
Proof. By Proposition 16,  is ﬁnitary. By Lemma 11-1,  is preference symmetric. Hence, by Proposition 12, GE() =⋃∞
i=0(F i), where F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = F (F i). Hence, GE() =
⋃∞
i=0(F i+) if the following holds:
for i = 0,1, . . . , F i ⊆ F i+, and if A ∈ F i+, A /∈ F i, then A ∈ F i+1. (1)
Firstly, note that by Lemma 11-5, no argument can defeatS [ ], and so [ ] must be acceptable w.r.t. ∅. Hence, by Lemma 6:
each F i+ in the above deﬁned sequence is conﬂict free. (2)
Base case:
i = 0: F 0 (= ∅) ⊆ F 0+ (= {[ ]}), and by Lemma 11-5 no argument defeats∅ [ ], and so [ ] ∈ F 1.
i = 1: Trivially, F 0 and F 0+ are conﬂict fee. F 0 ⊆ F 0+ and F 1 = F (F 0), F 1+ = F (F 0+), and so by monotonicity of F (Proposi-
tion 11) F 1 ⊆ F 1+ .
F 1+ and F 1 both contain all arguments that are not attacked by other arguments ({B | ∀A ∈ Args, (A, B) /∈ R}). F 1+ − F 1 =
a) {B | ∀A ∈ Args, if (A, B) ∈ R then ([ ], (A, B)) ∈ D}∪
b) {B | ∀A ∈ Args, if A →{[]} B then [ ] →{[ ]} A}. Note that by Lemma 11-5 A must be incoherent, and so by Deﬁni-
tion 32-3 there is no C ∈ Args s.t. (C, ([ ], A)) ∈ D, and so if [ ] →{[ ]} A then [ ] →S A for any S ⊆ Args, and {[ ] →S A} is
the reinstatement set for [ ] →S A.
Since [ ] ∈ F 1, then given a) and b), (F 1+ − F 1) ⊆ F 2.
Inductive hypothesis: (1) holds for j < i.
General case: F i ⊆ F i+ , and if A ∈ F i+ , A /∈ F i , then A ∈ F i+1: By inductive hypothesis, F i−1 ⊆ F i−1+ . By Proposition 6,
F i−1 is conﬂict free. By (2), F i−1+ is conﬂict free. Hence, by monotonicity of F , F i ⊆ F i+ .
By Proposition 6: a) F i−1 ⊆ F i . By inductive hypothesis: b) (F i−1+ − F i−1) ⊆ F i . a) and b) imply: c) F i−1+ ⊆ F i . Suppose
A ∈ F i+ and A /∈ F i . We therefore have that: A ∈ F (F i−1+ ); F i−1+ is conﬂict free by (2); F i is conﬂict free by Proposition 6;
and so given c), then by monotonicity of F , A ∈ (F (F i) = F i+1). 
Corollary 5. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the EAF for a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory, and GE() the grounded extension of . Let Fst
be the characteristic function of  based on strict acceptability (Deﬁnition 23). Let F∗0+ = {[ ]}, F∗i+1+ = Fst(F∗i+). Then, GE() =⋃∞
i=0(F∗i+).
Proof. Proof follows immediately from Lemma 19 and Corollary 3. 
In the following Lemmas 20 and 21 we refer to [34]’s deﬁnitions of an ALP-DP theory’s arguments Args, the attack
relation on Args, conﬂict free subsets of Args, T -defeat, ALP-DP-acceptability, an ALP-DP theory’s characteristic function G ,
and its grounded extension (all of which are deﬁned in this paper in Deﬁnition 31).
Lemma 20. Let (S, D) be an ALP-DP theory and T a conﬂict free subset of Args. Then G(T ) is conﬂict free.
Proof. Suppose G(T ) is not conﬂict free. Then ∃A, B ∈ G(T ) s.t. A attacks B , in which case A conclusion–conclusion or
undercut attacks B , in which case one can straightforwardly show that A T -defeats B and/or B T -defeats A. By assumption
of A and B acceptable w.r.t. S , there must exist arguments C, D ∈ T s.t. C T -defeats D , in which case T is not conﬂict free.
Contradiction. 
Lemma 21. Let (S, D) be a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory and GE((S, D)) the grounded extension of (S, D) as deﬁned as deﬁned
in [34] (deﬁned in this paper in Deﬁnition 31-8). Then GE((S, D)) =⋃∞i=0(Gi+), where G0+ = {[ ]}, Gi+1+ = G(Gi+), and G(Gi+) = {A |
A is ALP-DP-acceptable w.r.t Gi+}.
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Gi and Gi+ are conﬂict free, Gi ⊆ Gi+ , and if A ∈ Gi+ , A /∈ Gi , then A ∈ Gi+1. (1)
Base case:
i = 0: Trivially, G0 and G0+ are conﬂict fee, G0 (= ∅) ⊆ G0+ (= {[ ]}), and by Deﬁnition 31-4 no argument ∅-defeats [ ],
and so [ ] ∈ G1.
i = 1: G0 ⊆ G0+ , and G1 = G(G0), G1+ = G(G0+), and since G0 and G0+ are conﬂict fee, then by monotonicity of G (Propo-
sition 5.5 in [34]) G1 ⊆ G1+ , and by Lemma 20 G1 and G1+ are conﬂict free.
(G1+ − G1) = {X | ∀Y s.t. Y {[ ]}-defeats X, then [ ]{[ ]}-defeats Y }. One can straightforwardly show that if [ ] {[ ]}-defeats
Y then [ ] T -defeats Y for ny T . Hence, since [ ] ∈ G1, (G1+ − G1) ⊆ G2.
Inductive hypothesis: (1) holds for j < i.
General case: Gi and Gi+ are conﬂict free, Gi ⊆ Gi+ , and if A ∈ Gi+ , A /∈ Gi , then A ∈ Gi+1:
By inductive hypothesis, Gi−1 and Gi−1+ are conﬂict free, Gi−1 ⊆ Gi−1+ , and so by monotonicity of G , Gi ⊆ Gi+ , and by
Lemma 20 Gi and Gi+ are conﬂict free.
By monotonicity of G: a) Gi−1 ⊆ Gi . By inductive hypothesis: b) (Gi−1+ − Gi−1) ⊆ Gi . a) and b) imply: c) Gi−1+ ⊆ Gi . Sup-
pose A ∈ Gi+ and A /∈ Gi . Hence, A ∈ G(Gi−1+ ), Gi−1+ is conﬂict free, Gi is conﬂict free, and so given c), then by monotonicity
of G , A ∈ (G(Gi) = Gi+1). 
Proposition 17. Let (S, D) be a priority-ﬁnitary ALP-DP theory, and let GE((S, D)) be the grounded extension of (S, D) as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 31-8. Let  = (Args,R,D) be the theory’s EAF and GE() the grounded extension of . Then GE() and GE((S, D)) are
equivalent modulo the composite priority arguments.
Proof. Let Fst be the characteristic function of  based on strict acceptability, and F∗0+ = {[ ]}, F∗i+1+ = Fst(F∗i+). Let G be
the characteristic function of (S, D) and G0+ = {[ ]}, Gi+1+ = G(Gi+). Given Corollary 5 and Lemma 21, it is suﬃcient to show
that for ∀i, F∗i+ and Gi+ are equivalent modulo composite priority arguments (emcpa).
Base case: G1+ = G({[ ]}) = {X | ∀Y s.t. Y {[ ]}-defeats X , then [ ] strictly {[ ]}-defeats Y }∪ the arguments not {[ ]} defeated
by any argument, i.e.:
a) the arguments B that are not undercut or conclusion–conclusion attacked by any argument, and;
b) the arguments B that are not undercut by any argument, and for any A that conclusion–conclusion attacks B , B
undercuts A.
F∗1+ = Fst({[ ]}) = {X | ∀Y s.t. Ydefeats{[ ]}X, then [ ] strictly defeats{[ ]}Y }∪ the arguments not defeated{[ ]} by any argu-
ment, i.e.:
a) the arguments B that are not undercut or conclusion–conclusion attacked by any argument, i.e., {B | ∀A ∈ Args, (A, B) /∈
R}, and;
b) the arguments B that are not undercut by any argument, and for any A that conclusion–conclusion attacks B ((A, B) ∈
R), B undercuts A (and so ([ ], (A, B)) ∈ D).
Note that:
if B1, . . . , Bn are singleton priority arguments in F ∗1+ then
B = B1 + · · · + Bn is a composite priority argument in F∗1+
(1)
since: i) if any A conclusion–conclusion attacks B , then A conclusion–conclusion attacks some Bi , and so by b). Bi
undercuts A, hence B undercuts A and so ([ ], (A, B)) ∈ D; ii) ∀Y s.t. Y defeats{[ ]}B , Y defeats{[ ]} some Bi , and so by
assumption of Bi ∈ F∗1+ , [ ] strictly defeats{[ ]}Y .
Since Args and ArgsPS97 are emcpa, then given the above:
a) G1+ ⊆ F∗1+ .
b) If A ∈ F∗1+ , A /∈ G1+ , then A must be a composite priority argument A1 + · · · + An where i > 1, and for i = 1 . . .n, Ai
is a singleton priority argument.
c) By Lemma 13 and (1), A1 + · · · + An ∈ F∗1+ iff {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ F∗1+ , and so given a) and b):
d) {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ G1+ .
a)–d) establish that F∗1+ is closed under priority arguments, and F∗1+ and G1+ are emcpa.
Inductive hypothesis: For j < i, F∗ j+ is closed under priority arguments, and F∗ j+ and G j+ are emcpa.
General case: F∗i+ and Gi+ are emcpa.
We establish the following pre-conditions for applying Lemma 18:
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F∗i−1+ and Gi−1+ are emcpa.
• [ ] ∈ F∗i−1+ . By Lemma 6 and Corollary 3, F∗i−1+ is conﬂict free and F∗i−1+ ⊆ F∗i+ (every argument in F∗i−1 is strict-
acceptable w.r.t. F∗i−1).
• [ ] ∈ Gi−1+ , and by Lemma 20 and monotonicity of G , Gi−1+ is conﬂict free, and every argument in Gi−1+ is ALP-DP
acceptable w.r.t. Gi−1+ .
Given the above, then by Lemma 18:
∀A ∈ ArgsPS97, A is ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. Gi−1+ iff A is
strict-acceptable w.r.t. F ∗i−1+ . (4)
Suppose A ∈ Args, A /∈ ArgsPS97, and A is strict-acceptable w.r.t. F∗i−1+ . Then A ∈ F∗i+ must be a composite priority argument
A1 + · · · + An , where i > 1. By Lemma 13, {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ F∗i+ . Given (4) {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ Gi+ . Hence, F∗i+ and Gi+ are
equivalent modulo composite priority arguments. 
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